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Jimmy Carter and the Italian Communism seen by  
the revolutionary left: Il Manifesto case

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## *Abstract*

Nel presente lavoro di tesi, mi sono occupata del Presidente Americano Jimmy Carter e della sua politica nei confronti del comunismo italiano dal punto di vista della sinistra rivoluzionaria italiana, in questo caso *Il Manifesto*.

Studiando il Presidente Carter e leggendo alcuni dei suoi discorsi emerse come la sua politica verso il comunismo fosse totalmente diversa da quella dei suoi predecessori e dallo spirito incarnato negli Stati Uniti d'America, la cui lotta contro il comunismo è sempre stata attiva e ben manifesta non solo nel territorio nazionale ( con il fenomeno del Maccartismo) ma in tutto il mondo ( Guerra di Corea, Vietnam..), ho deciso così di esaminare come viene affrontata la quesitone comunista nella sua politica.

La prima parte della tesi ripercorre la differenza con le amministrazioni precedenti, la cui conduzione politica era considerata dallo stesso Carter priva di morale, mentre la politica carteriana è focalizzata interamente sul rispetto dei diritti umani, dando così un nuovo volto alla politica americana corrotta. La politica di Carter nei confronti del comunismo attraversò due fasi, dovuto anche alla differenza di visione incarnate dal suo staff, in particolare dal Segretario di Stato Vance e dal Consigliere per la Sicurezza Nazionale Brzezinski, la condotta politica del primo era caratterizzata da uno stile diplomatico schivo e prudente, mentre il secondo era deciso ad intraprendere ogni misura necessaria a contenere l'URSS.

Carter cercò di riportare in auge il prestigio americano scosso dalla guerra del Vietnam, rilanciando un'azione internazionale basata sul rispetto dei diritti umani. Questo lo portò a prendere certe decisioni in politica estera che non piacquero all'opinione pubblica americana poiché si avventurò su temi che venivano considerati dei tabù, come la firma del trattato con cui gli Stati Uniti si impegnarono a restituire allo stato di Panama la sovranità sul canale, e le negoziazioni per i trattati SALT II con l'Unione Sovietica. Altri successi furono le ripresa delle relazioni con la Cina e il riconoscimento diplomatico della Repubblica Popolare Cinese, ma il suo maggior successo fu la mediazione tra

egiziani e israeliani che si concluse con gli accordi di pace di Camp David che successivamente portarono al riconoscimento da parte dell'Egitto dello stato di Israele. Furono però due eventi a decretare la fine dell'amministrazione Carter: nel gennaio del 1979 la rivoluzione islamica in Iran e nel dicembre dello stesso anno l'invasione dell'Afghanistan da parte dell'Unione Sovietica. Quest'ultimo anno fu un completo fallimento per la presidenza Carter (viene spesso ricordato dalla storiografia per questo suo grande fiasco) dovuto soprattutto all'insuccesso del salvataggio degli ostaggi all'ambasciata a Teheran che avvenne solo con il Presidente Reagan

Nonostante il comunismo non fosse un tema centrale della politica di Carter, da quello che traspare la sua presidenza sembra una delle amministrazioni americane ad essere più aperta nei confronti del comunismo, tanto che prese posizioni molto diverse rispetto all'amministrazione Nixon per quanto riguarda la politica Eurocomunista. Infatti l'amministrazione Carter non solo concesse dei visti ad esponenti del partito comunista italiano, ma creò sul territorio della penisola una vero e proprio network di relazioni con alcuni rappresentanti del PCI. Poi però un cambio di veduta avvenne soprattutto nei confronti del rapporto con l'Unione Sovietica (poiché Carter alla fine decise di seguire la politica di Brzezinski) e quindi cambiò anche l'atteggiamento verso il PCI, proprio nel momento nel quale il partito avrebbe avuto la possibilità di ricoprire una carica importante nel governo. Il PCI si era illuso di avere la benedizione per la prima volta da parte di un presidente americano di poter godere di una certa posizione di potere all'interno di un paese del blocco occidentale ma dopo l'esplicita dichiarazione fatta dal presidente il 12 gennaio 1978, al PCI venne negato il "sostegno americano".

La seconda parte dell'elaborato tratta la nascita del gruppo del Il Manifesto, facendo una panoramica della situazione italiana degli anni sessanta con un occhio particolare puntato sulle cause e motivazioni che spinsero questo gruppo a staccarsi dal PCI e creare un quotidiano e un partito autonomo. Le cause principali di questo distacco si trovano nei movimenti studenteschi e operai, e soprattutto nell'invasione da parte delle truppe Sovietiche a Praga.

Il fenomeno mondiale della contestazione studentesca travolse anche l'Italia, a cui si aggiunsero le rivendicazioni operaie. La presenza di giovani operai a fianco degli studenti fu la caratteristica Sessantotto italiano, che fu il risultato di un malessere sociale profondo. Gli Italiani chiedevano delle riforme.

Il carattere rivoluzionario del movimento sessantottino era attribuito dalla sua natura anticonformista ed avrebbe trovato sbocco e sostegno dai partiti che rappresentavano la sinistra. La lotta iniziale contro ingiustizie, corruzioni e inefficienze tenderà, con il trascorrere del tempo, a trasformarsi in forme di opposizione sempre più estreme. Altra questione delicata del 1968, fu la cosiddetta Primavera di Praga. Nei paesi del Patto di Varsavia, si chiedevano più libertà di espressione e una maggiore considerazione delle opinioni e della volontà della popolazione sulle scelte politiche. La più importante delle manifestazioni di protesta fu la rivolta in Cecoslovacchia. Quella sarebbe stata un'ottima occasione per il movimento internazionale comunista di reagire unitariamente e soprattutto per il PCI di mostrare la sua "forza democratica", ma oltre che una condanna all'intervento Sovietico, non ci fu nessuna mobilitazione. Questa presa di posizione del PCI portò a discussioni interne e fu una delle motivazioni che spinsero il gruppo de Il Manifesto – Lucio Magri, Aldo Natoli, Luigi Pintor e Rossana Rossanda – che aveva fondato una rivista di ricerca politica e di contestazione a sinistra della linea ufficiale del partito ad essere radiati, in quanto non rispettavano il centralismo democratico cardine del partito. In realtà lo scopo dei dissidenti de Il Manifesto era quello di aprire una discussione all'interno del PCI e far in modo che il partito tornasse alle sue origini rivoluzionarie accogliendo così le proteste studentesche e operaie. Il Manifesto non fu solo un giornale, successivamente si trasformò in quotidiano, ma fu anche un vero e proprio partito politico, che assieme ad altre forze politiche, sempre della sinistra rivoluzionaria, diede vita al PDUP per il Comunismo. Questo esperimento politico però durò solo una decina di anni per poi riconfluire nel PCI.

All'interno del Partito Comunista, la "fazione de Il Manifesto non era l'unica presente, anzi questa faceva parte di una delle tre correnti presenti nel partito:

la destra di Amendola, il centro di Logo- Berlinguer e la sinistra si Ingrao. Ingrao era considerato come colui che poteva unire la tradizione del partito di Togliatti a una nuova leva di intellettuali italiani. Ingrao voleva risolvere il problema delle trasformazioni del capitalismo italiano, che non era più arretrato, come sosteneva Amendola, ma che doveva essere guidato verso un nuovo sviluppo in linea con la modernizzazione necessaria del sistema-paese. La sua politica si focalizzava sull'alternativa secca di sinistra al centrosinistra, infatti non accettava le possibilità intrinseche al centrosinistra, al contrario di Amendola e dello stesso Togliatti.

La terza parte invece si focalizza sull'analisi degli articoli di giornale de Il Manifesto dopo la dichiarazione del Presidente Carter fatta il 12 gennaio 1978, dove per la prima volta pose il veto in modo esplicito all'ingresso del PCI nel governo. L'amministrazione democratica si era mostrata più benevola dei suoi predecessori nei confronti del PCI, infatti in una panoramica del 1976 (dichiarazioni in campagna presidenziale) e 1977 (primo anno di presidenza) mostrano l'apertura politica americana nei confronti del PCI (visto concesso al corrispondente dell'Unità), ma proprio nel momento in cui si paventava la possibilità per i comunisti di ottenere una posizione mai avuta prima al governo, si vedono negare il "supporto" americana. È evidente come la dichiarazione non sia stata ideata dal presidente ma dai suoi più stretti consiglieri che vedevano la questione italiana più come un problema geopolitico (la sua posizione nel Mediterraneo e il mantenimento dello status quo delle sfere di influenze in Europa) che altro avendo avuto dal PCI diverse garanzie del suo carattere piuttosto democratico. (accettazione NATO, CEE, integrazione europea). In Italia le reazioni al diktat americano furono piuttosto moderate, mentre furono molto più dure e severe quelle provenienti dalla Francia, sicuramente dovute al suo background storico e culturale, ma probabilmente questa iniziativa e le sue conseguenti reazioni furono strumentalizzate da parte del Partito Comunista Francese in modo da avere più pubblicità in campagna elettorale.

Le fonti utilizzate per la stesura di questo lavoro sono stati per il primo capitolo i discorsi ufficiali del presidente, le sue memorie e quelle dei suoi principali collaboratori, i testi degli storiografi che si occuparono della sua presidenza e i documenti ufficiali scambiati tra le varie agenzie americane CIA, Casa Bianca, Ambasciata. Per il secondo, le opere biografiche scritte dai diretti interessati de il quotidiano e partito politico Il Manifesto e le opere dei storiografi italiani che si occuparono degli anni di piombo. Mentre per l'analisi dell'ultimo solo gli articoli del quotidiano Il Manifesto.

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## *INTRODUCTION*

This work has the purpose to examine the policy of Jimmy Carter towards the Italian Communism seen by the revolutionary left, in this case by Il Manifesto.

The first part of this work examines the thirty nine President of the United States policy conduct during his four years at the White House. At that time Americans were disillusioned with republican administration in the wake of the past years scandals ( Vietnam War, Watergate..) and Carter presented himself as an outsider to Washington politics.

To Carter, human rights could be at the core of all decisions and believed that they were the key to international stability. In reality Carter foreign policy was a continuum of the Nixon policy. In the foreign affairs arena he reasserted the U.S.'s ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other democracies, as well as he underlined his desire to decrease tensions with the Soviet Union; he worked for Middle East peace, organizing a round of meetings between Egypt's President Anwar el-Sadat and Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David. With the Camp David Accord ended the war between the two nations that had existed since the foundation of Israel in 1948; he reduced the danger of nuclear war (signed a bilateral strategic arms limitation treaty SALT II); he reopened U.S. relations with China while breaking ties with Taiwan, and with the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev ( creating tensions about the US-Soviet relations); he signed two treaties with Panama. But the most important event occurred during his mandate was also the one in which his political conduct failed, in 1979 a group of Iranian students entered in the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took its diplomatic staff as hostage as a protest against the arrival in the United States of the deposed Iranian shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, in order to receive medical treatment. The students had the support of Iran's revolutionary government, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The failure to free the hostages led Carter Administration to be perceived as inept and inefficient and this perception increased after the failure of a secret U.S. military mission in April

1980. Over the next decades, Carter built a distinguished career as a diplomat, humanitarian and author, pursuing conflict resolution in countries around the globe.

Carter's foreign policy changed over time, this was due in particular by the composition of his staff, and the different views within it. Brzezinski's differences with Vance were especially on policy toward the Soviet Union. Vance he believed that improvement of Soviet-American relations was both necessary and possible, and that an arms limitation agreements and cooperation in crisis areas such as the Middle East were essential to avoid nuclear war. He did not want to jeopardize the progresses made in the Soviet-American detente by contrasting Soviet interests in the Middle East or using the Chinese-American rapprochement. Brzezinski, instead saw the Soviet Union as permanent competitor with whom it had to fight. The disagreements between the National Security Advisor Brzezinski and the Secretary of State Vance characterized the nature of Carter's policy making process. The most important example occurred in the Annapolis Speech, where Carter ( who wrote by himself the speech) put together two memos, one from his Secretary of State, who wanted to preserve detente, and the one from his National Security advisor, who wanted to use any kind of measures to fight against the Soviet Union.

Carter administration replace anti- communism with the human rights policy. According to Brzezinski the inclination of the communist movement toward a destalinization and deleninization should have encouraged and that these inclination were already advanced in PCI but the participation in the government should have not favored it, on the contrary it should have been delayed these inclinations. The Eurocommunism for the Administration was not a primary theme in foreign policy, and Carter had a different approach toward the communism, in fact in demonstration of good will the Carter administration granted the visas to some Italian communists ( Jacoviello, correspondent of L'Unità, Napolitano...) who wished to visit the US, and on the Italian soil adopted a policy of expansion of the US Embassy's contacts with the Italian Communist Party. In foreign policy he stated counterproductive the absence of contacts of

the American Embassies with the left oppositions in Italy and Spain, because even if the US did not have to favor the access to the power to the communist party, it would have to face that perspective. The vision of the American policy toward the Eurocommunism was not only isolated to the no interference and to a major respect of the Italian internal context, but it was insert in a vision that wanted to create an interaction in the democratic evolution of PCI. But the 12<sup>th</sup> January 1978 Carter made a declaration in which he explicitly put the veto on the entrance in the government or in a coalition of the PCI.

The second part examines the Italian situation of the sixties, the 1968 movement ( the student and worker struggle) and the Prague Spring which was the main causes that brought to a group within the PCI to create a magazine, a newspaper and then an autonomous political group, Il Manifesto and also the reasons of the split with the PCI.

After Toglietti's death, Lonfo had been elected ad interim as new secretary of the party, and then was chosen Berlinguer. During his direction within the party the left by Ingrao and the right by Amendola faced. According to Amendola the openness to the left has been a failure, PSI should abandoned its alliance with DC and it should come back to cooperate with communists. To empashise the necessity of that alliance Amendola proposed a fusion between PSI and PCI and he underlined that the future of the left was not socialist but democratic.

Ingrao, instead, made a different and pessimistic analysis. According to him the danger was not the exclusion from the government but the gradual shifting toward social democrats positions. Socialism had to be the main subject in the agenda, but it would be possible only if PCI had resisted to progressive reformism. To do this the party had to become more democratic and rejected the idea of the democratic centralism. The fight was won by the right. Also because the Ingrao formation was not well organized, beside the fact that Longo and Berlinguer was much more closer to Amendola.

In Czechoslovakia was realized an experiment to made more democratic the Stalinist system. The project envisaged the enlargement of the political

participation of the citizens and the economic reorganization, with the renounce of the absolute power by the state. The fear that this democratic process could have spread in other countries of the Soviet block, the USSR decided to intervene with the troops in order to put an end to this project. A lot of national communist parties around the world disagreed with this violent choice.

PCI condemned the fact, but this was not the reaction that the dissident expected. So Luigi Pintor, Rossana Rossanda, Aldo Natoli, Luciana Castellina e Massimo Caprara decided to create a magazine such as insubordination act toward the democratic centralism of the PCI. The radiation came after the publishing of an article “ Prague is alone” where the PCI was blamed to have abandon Dubcek and his comrades. It was the casus belli. Il Manifesto became a newspaper and a party the PDUP.

The break between the PCI and Il Manifesto occurred for three reasons:

a) a clear opposition to the URSS loyalty that the PCI still had, even if with some terms.

b) a growth of the social conflict. That time there were strong worker struggles, that fought with the right provocation ( 12<sup>th</sup> December 1969 occurred the attack in Piazza Fontana, in Milan) and the attitude of the open riot, kept by the majority of the student movement toward the union labor. Il Manifesto group understood the necessity to gather the culture and the themes of the workers movement and connected them with the elements of novelty, of contestation and of policy born in the 1968.

c) the necessity to renewal the party not only in the policy matters, but also in the way of being, putting in discussion the democratic centralism with the enlargement of an internal democracy.

On those points occurred the fight between the PCI and Il Manifesto group that was radiated in 1968, deleting in this way the possibility of a political discussion.

Il Manifesto, was not only a newspaper but it became also fierce little party. Even before its political function, the cultural one would be the one to strongly criticize the controversial role of the Italian left.

The last part is an analysis of the articles of Il Manifesto and the image that it gives to Italians of the American President after the declaration made on 12th January 1978.

# Chapter I

## *The American Situation*

### *1. The New Administration*

After the presidential debates and a devastating answer made by Ford<sup>1</sup>, Jimmy Carter<sup>2</sup> became President.

The 39<sup>th</sup> President of the United States, believed in a global community, he refused the anti-communism feeling of the Cold War<sup>3</sup> and rejected the realpolitik of Nixon<sup>4</sup> and Kissinger<sup>5</sup> because he considered it a lacking of moral foundation<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> After the first debate, according to the polls Ford was favored, as well as in the second one. Max Frankel (a journalist of the New York Times) asked to president Ford a question about the effect of the Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, "There is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and there never will be under a Ford Administration". The Journalist believing that the President had not expressed well reworked the question: "Did I understand to you to say, Sir that the Russians are not using eastern Europe as their own sphere of influence and occupying most of the countries there and making sure with their troops that it's a communist zone?" and Ford answered: "I don't believe, Mr. Frankel, that the Yugoslavians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't believe that the Romanians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't believe that the Poles consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. Each of those countries is independent, autonomous; it has its own territorial integrity. And the US does not concede that those countries are under the domination of the Soviet Union". The following comment of Jimmy Carter was: "I would like to see Mr. Ford convince the Polish, Americans and the Czech-Americans and the Hungarian-Americans in this country that those countries don't live under the domination and supervision of the Soviet Union behind the Iron Curtain"

<sup>2</sup> Jimmy Carter a born again Christian that made difference in the elections. Polls show that Carter enjoyed 25% margin over president Ford among evangelical voters, a truly political reversal. Since the civil war the evangelical had never given the majority of their voters to democratic presidential candidate.

<sup>3</sup> Change from the "global community" approach during the early years (1977/1978) to the "arc of crisis" approach in the latter years (1979/1980).

<sup>4</sup> Richard Nixon was elected the 37<sup>th</sup> President of the United States (1969-1974) after previously serving as a U.S. Representative and a U.S. Senator from California. During visits in 1972 to Beijing and Moscow, he reduced tensions with China and the U.S.S.R. His summit meetings with Russian leader Leonid I. Brezhnev produced a treaty to limit strategic nuclear weapons. In January 1973, he announced an accord with North Viet Nam to end American involvement in Indochina. In 1974, his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, negotiated disengagement agreements between Israel and its opponents, Egypt and Syria. He became the only President to ever resign the office

<sup>5</sup> Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born in Bavaria by a Jewish family, and left Germany in 1938 in order to escape from the Nazi persecutions. In 1968 entered in the political scene close to Nelson Rockefeller, but the first commitment was in 1969 when Nixon nominated him as his National Security Advisor. Kissinger was the artefact of the detente in the relations between US and USSR, the reduction of the nuclear weapons always assuring to US political and military hegemony. Kissinger worked for re-establishing the diplomatic relations between US and the Communist China. In 1973 he proposed a gradual retirement of the American troops from Vietnam and the support of the South Vietnamese army. In the same year he is accused to have supported August Pinochet in the Golpe in Chile. After the Watergate scandal he continued to be in politics till the end of Ford Administration.

<sup>6</sup> Del Pero, M. "Libertà e Impero: gli Stati Uniti e il mondo 1776-2006", p354.

, basing his foreign policy doctrine on human rights<sup>7</sup>. Morality and human rights were the banner of the Carter policy rather than the USSR containment for the conduct of the American policy. According to Carter “*abandon the confrontation US-USSR and get rid of the exaggerated fear of communism that brought in the past to bound to any dictator able to tie to US in the name of fear, the commitment of the US in the defense of the human rights would be absolute*”<sup>8</sup>. According to the most commentators Carter is seen as an outsider in the corrupted temple of the American policy<sup>9</sup>.

Carter and his advisers believed that a bipolar view of world could not explain the increasing complexity of the international system<sup>10</sup>. The US foreign policy had to adopt a different approach due to the diffusion of international power and the growth of interdependence. Generally the one who declared some confusion and weakness in the management of the Carter policy saw the problem in the division among Carter’s top advisers. The people chosen by the president for being part of his staff indicates which would be the policy of the new administration and also if it would have the chance to achieve its goals. The clash between Vance, Secretary of State, and Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, was a critical source of political inconsistency. The clash between two was a symptom not a cause of Carter’s foreign policy problems<sup>11</sup>. In the first year of the term, Carter followed more Vance’s orientation, while Brzezinski kept a low public profile. But when the president’s public approval ratings declined, due to the conservative attack’s on his liberal policies, Carter chose Brzezinski such as main advisor. Brzezinski’s more aggressive outlook and reputation, especially on US-Soviet relations<sup>12</sup>, provided a better fit with the conservative domestic political climate than did Vance’s preference for patient diplomacy. The growing of influence by Brzezinski and the receding role by Vance reflected Carter’s

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<sup>7</sup> The main value on which the containment doctrine revolved was the anti-communism, for Carter human rights were the main value for his liberal internationalism. Carter hoped to convince at home and abroad that the US was a force for justice and progress in the world with the policy of human rights.

<sup>8</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1977.

<sup>9</sup> Del Pero, "Libertà e Impero", p. 368.

<sup>10</sup> Skidmore, "Reversing Course", p. 28.

<sup>11</sup> Skidmore, "Reversing Course", p. 29.

<sup>12</sup> Garthoff, "Détente and Confrontation",

gradual move away from his early liberal foreign policy orientation in response to domestic pressures.

## 2. *The Meaning of “Global Community” Through Jimmy Carter’s Term*

Observers agree that the Carter administration’s foreign policies changed over time. Some argue that Carter’s retreat from his administration’s initial policy orientations emerged gradually over the course of his four years in office. Others portray substantial continuity across the first three years of Carter’s term, followed by a shift in tone and policy in the aftermath of the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The great majority of observers depict the direction of policy change in similar terms: the administration abandoned Carter’s initial inclinations toward liberal rhetoric in favor of a traditional Cold War containment strategy<sup>13</sup>.

It is refused the idea of America’s Cold War view as a bipolar world in which U.S. foreign policy was driven by the containment of Soviet expansionism and replaced it with a multipolar view<sup>14</sup>. Interdependence and pluralism are a fact and the United States and the Soviet Union could not control the destiny of the planet<sup>15</sup>. Global community became a fundamental point in the complex international system and President Carter expressed this belief in a speech before the United Nations *“We have already become a global community—but only in the sense that we face common problems and we share, for good or evil, a common future. In this community, power to solve the world’s problems—particularly economic and political power—no longer lies in the hands of a few nations. Power is now widely shared among many nations with different cultures and different histories and different aspirations”*<sup>16</sup>. The Carter administration, replaced anti-communism with the promotion of human rights and preventive

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<sup>13</sup> Skidmore, “Reversing Course”.

<sup>14</sup> Garthoff, “Détente and Confrontation”.

<sup>15</sup> Kaufman, “Plans unraveled: The foreign policy of the carter administration”

<sup>16</sup> Carter, “US role in a peaceful global community, adress before the 32nd UN General Assembly, 4<sup>th</sup> October 1977”.



diplomacy in order to promote a new system of world order, the global community. The Carter Administration sought to improve the world, attempting to promote a new system of world order based upon international stability, peace, and justice. Enhancing the North South relations was a main point for the Carter goal of promoting a global community. *“We will cooperate more closely with the newly influential countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. We need their friendship in a common effort as the structure of world power changes”*<sup>17</sup>. By the end of 1977 a combination of “global community” and “regionalist”<sup>18</sup> involved a new cooperation between US and Third World relations.

In 1978 there was a change in this view on the response to Soviet support to Cuban and Ethiopian troops fighting against Somali guerillas. Brzezinski wanted that U.S. used its military power sending an aircraft carrier task force into the area. On the other side, Vance knew that the Soviets wanted to exploit a local situation but he did not consider the issue as one of U.S.—Soviet rivalry. Carter sided with Vance<sup>19</sup>. The Carter Administration’s global community approach continued into its second year, although differences in individual thinking emerged. While President Carter and Secretary Vance adhered to the metaphor of global community, Brzezinski’s thinking changed putting more emphasis on political-military issues and the need to contain the Soviet Union’s foreign interventionism. Carter and Vance remained committed to their original view of the Soviet Union while Brzezinski became increasingly pessimistic concerning Soviet cooperation and the positive benefits of a complex international system<sup>20</sup>.

In 1979, Vance still believing in the view of a complex international system and in the new world order (the “global community” metaphor), instead Brzezinski perceived an unstable international system open to Soviet interventionism (the “arc of crisis” metaphor). Carter at times shared Vance’s

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<sup>17</sup> Carter, “A foreign policy based on America’s essential character, address made at the commencement exercises of Notre Dame University, 22 May 1977”.

<sup>18</sup> Jackson, D; “Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia”, p 7.

<sup>19</sup> Glad “An outsider in the white house: Jimmy carter, his advisors and the making of American foreign policy.”

<sup>20</sup> Daalder, Destler, “In the shadow of the oval office: Profiles of the national security advisers and the presidents they served—From JFK to George W. Bush”.

optimism but at the same time seemed in line with Brzezinski's pessimistic approach. Carter's indecision was due the cooperative and competitive aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The fourth year (1980) marked the end of the Carter Administration's vision of a global community, even though Vance continued to fight for the "global community". The main point became the containment of Soviet expansionism and maintenance of the West's security in Europe, the Far East, and the Southwest Asia. Two events in particular overwhelmed the belief of Administration officials: the taking of American hostages in revolutionary Iran and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was considered the major destabilizing force in the world and a direct threat to the West. Brzezinski specifically argued that the Persian Gulf represented the "third central strategic zone"—after, first, Western Europe and the Far East—vital to the U.S. and the West after World War II that was under challenge by Soviet expansionism<sup>21</sup>. Following the invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Doctrine<sup>22</sup> was enunciated.

### 3. *Lacking of Moral Foundation*

The US had to avoid a "limitationist" attitude<sup>23</sup> so Nixon and Kissinger followed three main directions: the reconstruction of the internal consensus on the international choices of the country, the involvement of the USSR in the management of the bipolarity, in particular in Europe, and the reduction of the global intervention. Nixon and Kissinger gave an initial response very popular<sup>24</sup>, first the US did not have unlimited sources so it could not fight in the name of the communism containment, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to maintain the status quo

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<sup>21</sup> Brzezinski, "The quest for global security: The third phase. Remarks before the council on foreign relations in Denver, Colorado"

<sup>22</sup> This doctrine was proclaimed by the President the 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1980, and it established that the US should have use its military force to defend its own national interests in the Persian Gulf. The doctrine was the response to the Soviet invasion of the Afghanistan in 1979.

<sup>23</sup> Del Pero, "Libertà e Impero", p 355.

<sup>24</sup> Del Pero, "Libertà e Impero", p. 356.

and elaborate new strategies. According to Kissinger the post war era was ended and it meant to create new strategies more appropriate for the seventies<sup>25</sup>. The second point was not in line with the American principles of the destiny and the mission of the US in fact the approach invited the US to see beyond its borders to find a new model on which conduct the foreign policy, in order to do this the subject to study was Europe even if it always has been consider the alter ego from which go away, but US had to learn to lead the foreign policy as the other nations because the American idealism brought the foreign policy based on the national interest and on the balance of power<sup>26</sup>. The limits of the US forced it to adopt model of realpolitik as the European had, with the purpose of having foreign policy on the basis of the sources available. Nixon and Kissinger promised the reduction of the military budget, but without appearing as a retreat in the challenge for the hegemony with Moscow. This new political strategy should have begun a process of distension with the USSR in fact some factors brought to have a dialogue with Moscow. First of all the nuclear weapon negotiation between the two superpowers would have limited the proliferation of the nuclear weapons and as consequence stabilize the principle of deterrence on which the two powers built their own security policy<sup>27</sup>. Second the stabilization of Europe should have allowed a reduction in terms of economic burdens<sup>28</sup>. To this perspective there were also the question of the end of the Vietnam war and the consequent opening to the Chinese Popular Republic. In Vietnam the aim was to reduce at least the impact of the defeat and the international credibility held by USA. Kissinger asked for a gap between the retirement of the US armies and the unification of Vietnam under the communism. The opening with China depended on the distension with Moscow. The two Communist countries were not in good relationship and in 1969

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<sup>25</sup> Schulzinger, " Henry Kissinger. Doctor of diplomacy".

<sup>26</sup> Kissinger, "Years of Upheaval", p. 50.

<sup>27</sup> Negotiation between the two superpowers should have consolidated the principle of deterrence, on which the two countries had accepted to build their political security. Neither Washington or Moscow could see a final victory. Thought the distension US could have control and handle the Soviet Union guaranteed the acceptance de facto of the existential global order. ( Garfthoff, " Détente and confrontation", p.33).

<sup>28</sup> It should have allowed a reduction of the burdens in the foreign policy and in the released requests from relevant sector of the American public opinion.

they fought on the Ussuri river<sup>29</sup>. The aim of US was have relationship with China in order to put pressure on the USSR and it helped for the containment of USSR in Asia.

The end of BW signed the weakness of US, an advantage for Japan and Germany and the crisis of the capitalistic model and the end of the economic development based on the centrality of US and the Atlantic area. The distention was the real reason of the US decline and not an answer for it<sup>30</sup>. The turning point happened in 1972 with the SALT agreement: this meant a nuclear superiority of Moscow on the US because USSR never accepted the impossibility of a nuclear war and because it offered a blackmail able to stop US and to lead western Europe to become a satellite of the USSR. The immorality of the SALT concerned the parity between the two superpowers that was unthinkable. It meant a weakness from the US to give their own security in others hands.

#### 4. Human Rights

Jimmy Carter wanted to give a new morality in American diplomacy<sup>31</sup>, especially he focus on the pursuit of human rights: "*Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.*"<sup>32</sup>. At the commencement address at Notre Dame University, Carter underlined the difference between his policy and the policies of his predecessors, who had pursued the "*flawed and erroneous principles and*

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<sup>29</sup> Since 1961 the relations between USSR and China were minimal, the only contact was during the Vietnam war were both nations fought on the Vietnam side. In 1966 China launched the great proletarian cultural revolution against the soviet revisionism. On January 1977, the Red Guards besieged the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, but the situation steyed stable. A year later the Soviet troops attacked the Chinese border guard on the Ussuri River but the crisis did not transformed in war.

<sup>30</sup> Del Pero, "Libertà e Impero", p 360-361.

<sup>31</sup> Moral diplomacy is a new diplomatic approach proposed by [US President Woodrow Wilson](#) in his 1912 election. Moral diplomacy concerns the support to countries whose moral beliefs are the same of the US. In this way the nation's ideals improve and increase while the nations with different ideologies are in damage. This policy was used by Woodrow Wilson to support countries with [democratic governments](#) and to economically damage non-democratic countries, in particular the one that could be a threats to the US. He also wanted to increase the number of democratic nations, particularly in [Latin America](#).

<sup>32</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1977.

*tactics of our adversaries.*"<sup>33</sup> The interdependent world of the 1970s required a "new American foreign policy"<sup>34</sup> grounded in key principles, such as the "commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy."<sup>35</sup> The Presidential Directive 30 ( document 1) defines the objectives of the Carter's policy, it evaluates actions to improve human rights, it re-examines national security considerations, and it proposes effective actions. Since the main point of US foreign policy should be the respect of global human rights, Presidential Directive 30 gives the specific tools for U.S. human rights policy and indicated what kind of rights the United States would protect. The United States would use "the full range of diplomatic tools"<sup>36</sup> including public statements, consultations with allies, and cooperation with non-governmental actors and international organizations. Presidential Directive 30 thus formally defined U.S. policy on human rights.

##### 5. Notre Dame Speech

At the Notre Dame speech in May 1977, President Carter listed the five objects for foreign policy in his administration. Carter's belief in human liberty, which was the foundation stone of the United States, led him to argue that the American people had a special obligation to follow a human rights oriented foreign policy<sup>37</sup>. Carter's main point was to reaffirm America's "commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy"<sup>38</sup>. With the Vietnam War the US had lost its way but according to the President, America has found its roots: "Through failure we have now found our way back to our principles and values, and we have regained our lost confidence."<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>34</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>35</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>36</sup> Carter, " Presidential Directive 30".

<sup>37</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1977.

<sup>38</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>39</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

Second Carter's point was to reinforce the relations between democracies to show to the undemocratic nations the privileges to be one of them.

Carter's foreign policy toward Soviet Union was "*to engage the Soviet Union in a joint effort to halt the strategic arms race*", because arms races are "*morally deplorable*"<sup>40</sup>. Carter did not want only an arms reduction for the two superpowers but also "*a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing, a prohibition against all chemical warfare, no attack capability against space satellites, and arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.*"<sup>41</sup>

Carter's purpose was to create peace in the Middle East with three actions: first "*define what peace to them would mean*", second "*how can the dispute over border delineations be established and settled with a feeling of security on both sides*" and finally the "*issue of the Palestinian homeland.*"<sup>42</sup>

Another theme in Carter's speech was the idea that for too long the foreign policy of the US concerned "*an irrational (inordinate) fear of communism*"<sup>43</sup>. A fear of communist expansion that forced the United States to support dictators and regimes repugnant to the fundamental values of America, and Carter promises that this approach will not be used anymore. In particular Carter denied the policy used by his predecessor that use the same tactics of their not democratic enemies "*For too many years, we've been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We've fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is best quenched with water. This approach failed ...*"<sup>44</sup>. This statement confirm the need of the US to adopt a foreign policy of human rights in order to be faithful to its moral roots.

Furthermore the US had to gain its position of the center of the world, but in recent years it not held any more that position. "*Our nation is not old*" he says

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<sup>40</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>41</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>42</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>43</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>44</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

*“America was largely on the periphery of world affairs before World War II, But since then, we have inescapably been at the center of world affairs.”*<sup>45</sup> Some event such as the Vietnam War, had served to produce *“a profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our own policy and our system of life, a crisis of confidence made even more grave by the covert pessimism of some of our leaders.”*<sup>46</sup> But Carter presented a new opportunity for the US *“we can already see dramatic worldwide advances in the protection of the individual from the arbitrary power of the state. For us to ignore this trend would be to lose influence and moral authority in the world. To lead it will be to regain the moral stature we once had.”*<sup>47</sup> And even if the world may be new, the moral responsibilities of Americans remain as strong and constant as ever: *“It is a new world, but America should not fear it. It is a new world, and we should help to shape it. It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy—a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision.”*<sup>48</sup> The United States with the new administration has the moral foundation, and the strength necessary to reaffirm itself not only as the center of world affairs, but also as a beacon of freedom.

Despite Carter’s aim of putting the US as the center of world affairs another theme of his political action was the cooperation among the nations of the world *“It’s a beginning aimed towards a clear goal: to create a wider framework of international cooperation suited to the new and rapidly changing historical circumstances.”*<sup>49</sup> Carter also emphasizes better relationships with China and the Soviet Union, as well as working *“together with our European allies and with the concerned African States to shape a congenial international framework for the rapid and progressive transformation of southern African society and to help protect it from unwarranted outside influence.”*<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>46</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>47</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>48</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>49</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>50</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

## 6. Cooperation or Confrontation: The Annapolis Speech

In the spring of 1978 there were tensions about the US-Soviet relations. In the second year of the Carter Administration, détente was in decline. In May Gromyko met President Carter and both had some different views over the Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa<sup>51</sup> and over human rights<sup>52</sup>.

Vance believed that if America should have shown hostility to USSR they would have acting in an hard line and forced US to respond. He suggested to “*accept the Soviet competition and to not link the Soviet behavior in the third World to issues in which we had so fundamental an interest as SALT*”<sup>53</sup>. In the other hand, Brzezinski suggested an hard line, through bilateral relations as a leverage<sup>54</sup>.

*“Detente between our two countries is central to world peace” “Our long-term objective must be to convince the Soviet Union of the advantages of cooperation and of the costs of disruptive behavior.”*<sup>55</sup> *“Our principal goal is to help shape a world which is more responsive to the desire of people everywhere for economic well-being, social justice, political self-determination, and basic human rights.”*<sup>56</sup> *“The abuse of basic human rights in their own country, in violation of the agreement which was reached at Helsinki, has earned them the condemnation of people everywhere who love freedom. By their actions, they've demonstrated that the Soviet system cannot tolerate freely expressed ideas or notions of loyal opposition and the free movement of peoples.”*<sup>57</sup> *“We want to increase our collaboration with the Soviet Union, but also with the emerging nations, with the nations of Eastern Europe, and with the People's Republic of China. We are*

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<sup>51</sup> In the Horn of Africa, the soviets had closer ties with Ethiopia. When the tribal disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia led to a conflict, Soviets assisted new ally. Not only Soviet but also Cuban provided training for the Ethiopian military. Brzezinski urged the president to aid Somalia

<sup>52</sup> Carter criticized violations of human rights in the Soviet Union and East Europe. Soviet considered the human rights campaign of the Carter Administration as an American plan impeach détente and to slow arms control negotiations. ( See: Garthoff, “ Détente and Confrontation”)

<sup>53</sup> Vance, “ Hard Choices” p. 101-102.

<sup>54</sup> The China card

<sup>55</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at the Commencement Exercises at the United States Naval Academy," June 7, 1978.

<sup>56</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at the Commencement Exercises at the United States Naval Academy," June 7, 1978

<sup>57</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at the Commencement Exercises at the United States Naval Academy," June 7, 1978



*particularly dedicated to genuine self-determination and majority rule in those areas of the world where these goals have not yet been attained.*<sup>58</sup> *“The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice.”*<sup>59</sup>

The speech was written by the president himself. Carter had put together his speech to the Annapolis cadets combining together the notes that he should have given to his secretary of state, who wanted to preserve détente, and to his national security adviser<sup>60</sup>, who was looking carefully the Soviet expansionism in the Third World. The fact that the President prepared an important foreign policy address in this way shown that he could not neither recognize nor reconcile the differences between his principal foreign policy advisers<sup>61</sup>. Carter rarely give full attention to the preparation and presentation of his foreign policy speeches. The failure of Annapolis speech was due by the different and conflicting strategic plans in his conduct of foreign policy and in his indecision to choose which side follow, Vance or Brzezinski. This show the instability of Carter policy toward the Soviet and the inability of the administration to develop a coherent and effective rhetorical strategy<sup>62</sup>.

Naturally the Soviet response has come and *“they accused the president to undermine détente and that a substantial part of the president’s speech was devoted to fabrications concerning the Soviet Union and its System”*<sup>63</sup>. *“The soviet leadership considered the speech not as a choice for them, but as a choice for confrontation already made by Carter”*<sup>64</sup>. *“the basically aggressive hard line of Brzezinski, widely known for his anticommunist bias, is getting the upper hand in the White House. This policy is fraught with the return to the cold war... with a transition to confrontation”*<sup>65</sup>. The US government was accused of whipping up arms race, of adopting a dangerous anti-Soviet alignment with China, of turning

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<sup>58</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at the Commencement Exercises at the United States Naval Academy," June 7, 1978

<sup>59</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at the Commencement Exercises at the United States Naval Academy," June 7, 1978

<sup>60</sup> Fallows, J, "The Passionless Presidency", Atlantic Monthly, May 1979.

<sup>61</sup> Skidmore, "Reversing Course"

<sup>62</sup> Grover, W. "The President as Prisoner: a structural critique of the Carter and Reagan years".

<sup>63</sup> "Moscow replies: Carter's policies blocking detente", Washington Post, June 8, 1978.

<sup>64</sup> Garthoff, ibidem, p.667.

<sup>65</sup> Vladimir Bol'shakov, "The week Internationally", Pravda, June 11, 1978.

to armed intervention in Africa, of deliberately slowing down negotiations on strategic arms limitation, and of deliberately worsening bilateral relations with the USSR<sup>66</sup>.

Carter lack of national political experience contributed to those mistakes. Vance had the foreign and defense policy experience and Brzezinski the policy oriented conceptualization, but they did not share a common policy direction. Carter was equivocal in his attitude toward détente during the election campaign. Early in his term he stated clearly “ *now I believe in détente with Soviet Union. To me, it means progress toward peace*”<sup>67</sup> . Détente involved both cooperation and competition, the difference arose when and how it was appropriate to pursue cooperation and competition. Vance more often saw possibilities for cooperation, while Brzezinski for competition. Vance saw the possibility to regulate competition and to build cooperation. Carter wanted to improve relations with Soviet Union on the basis of mutual respect and benefit but he did not put improvement of relations with Soviet in his foreign policy agenda. Carter decided to reduce the profile and the substance of America Soviet relations<sup>68</sup>.

## *7. Successes and Failures in Foreign Policy*

Carter foreign policy was a continuum of the Nixon policy<sup>69</sup> .

The president changed the American relationships with Panama, and by doing so also changed American’s reputation in Latin America and among developing nations<sup>70</sup>, in the Middle East he served as an instigator, and then a mediator, in the peace process that transformed the relationships between Israel and Egypt. Most important for President Carter was the cause of human rights on the American political agenda and in the world community. These were significant accomplishments in his agenda, as well as for the impact that had on

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<sup>66</sup> Editorial, “ On the Present Policy of the US Government”, Pravda, June 17. 1978.

<sup>67</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>68</sup> Garthoff, “ Détente and Confrontation”.

<sup>69</sup> salt, panama treaties, Sino-US relations, the middle east step by step approach.

<sup>70</sup> See: Strong, “ Working in the World”,

international politics. But the Carter administration is still considered as an era of failure in foreign affairs. One reason is that the great part of the foreign policy goals Carter were unpopular, like the Panama Canal treaties, or like the arms control, détente, the recognition of China, and the Middle East peace. On those controversial issue, there were interest groups or communities, whose members were hostile to Carter's policies<sup>71</sup>. Besides the fact that Carter was new to international politics, and the unpopularity of some of the items on his agenda, two were the main critics on the performance in his foreign affairs. One criticism involves his style of decision making, the other the substance of the decisions he made about the US-USSR relations. The former concerned the attention to detail without thinking about a broad strategic vision, he failed to resolve the important differences between his Secretary of State and his National Security Adviser that contributed to inconsistency in the development and implementation of his foreign policy agenda. The core of the disputes between Vance and Brzezinski involved the US relations with Soviet Union and the status of Cold War. This was the crucial problem with the president's conduct of foreign policy.

### *7.1 Camp David Accord*

During the 1976 campaign Carter, to gain the support of the Jewish opinion supported the desire of Israel<sup>72</sup> to have "*defensible borders*"<sup>73</sup>. The Middle East was a great oil supplier for the American needs and the instability could have damage the US economy and according to his engagement in the human rights he could also have find a solution to the Palestinian refugees<sup>74</sup>. In May 1977

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<sup>71</sup> Strong, " Working in the world"

<sup>72</sup> Since its creation after World War II Israel had always had troubles with Arab neighbors. From 1948 Israel fought different wars and in the last one, in 1967, it won against Egypt, Jordan and Syria keeping the Sinai Peninsula from Cairo; the West Bank and Jerusalem from Amman, and the Golan Heights from Damascus. The United States drew some resolution 242 ( Israel had to withdraw from the territory occupied and all the nations involved in the conflict had to respect the boundaries of the others) and 338 ( the request to negotiate a Middle East Peace for Israel and Arabs)

<sup>73</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Visit of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel - Remarks of the President and the Prime Minister at the Welcoming Ceremony," March 7, 1977.

<sup>74</sup> Kaufman and Kaufman, " Presidency of James Earl Carter", p 53.

Vance<sup>75</sup> with the Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko<sup>76</sup> cooperate to establish an US-Soviet statement for the Middle East peace settlement. So the White House and the Kremlin called for a Conference in Geneva<sup>77</sup>. Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister invited to Jerusalem Sadat, the President of Egypt, then Carter asked them to join him in Washington<sup>78/79</sup>. The final accord declared the withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai and the establishment of normal Egyptian-Israeli relations.

## 7.2 Panama

President Carter wanted to correct the injustices in the US-Panamanian relations, even if a new treaty with Panama would be politically controversial<sup>80</sup>.

According to Brzezinski the Panama Canal Treaties for Jimmy Carter *“represented the ideal fusion of morality and politics; he was doing something good for peace, responding to the passionate desires of a small nation, and yet helping the long-range us national interest”*<sup>81</sup>. The Panamanian wanted the control over the canal and zone, while the United States wanted that the Panama accept the legitimation of the American involvement in the security of the canal even if was transfer to Panama. Most citizens not care about the future of the canal and the one who did tend to have patriotic reaction on the surrender of American towards a tiny central America nation. In the Congress the situation was not better, DeConcini<sup>82</sup> submitted an amendment to the neutrality treaty *“to take such steps as each [the U.S. or Panama] deems necessary, in accordance with its constitutional processes, including the use of military force in the Republic*

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<sup>75</sup> Vance and Brzezinski claimed that any action in the Middle East required a Soviet support, otherwise Moscow could have sabotage the agreement.

<sup>76</sup> For the Soviets such joint statement could meant underline the America’s acceptance of superpower parity and also improve Moscow prestige.

<sup>77</sup> See: Kaufman, “ Plans Unraveled”, p 79-80.

<sup>78</sup> Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem was seen by the Soviet as an American plan to remove the Soviet Union from the Middle East, and in particular the visit by the two leaders in Washington confirmed the Carter’s double play.

<sup>79</sup> See: Kaufman, “Plans Unraveled”, p. 81/84.

<sup>80</sup> Carter, “ Keeping Faith”, p 155.

<sup>81</sup> Brzezinski, “ Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981”. P. 137.

<sup>82</sup> See: Strong, “ Working in the World”, p. 152-182.

*of Panama, to reopen the Canal or restore the operations of the Canal, as the case may be.*"<sup>83</sup>

There was some tension and ambiguity between the two statements: the US would have the right to defend the canal against any aggression which imply the use of force by some nations or parties outside Panama, guaranteeing a permanent involvement in the defense of the canal. The compromise was the American defense of the Canal against any future threat without violating Panama territorial integrity or political independence .

### 7.3 SALT II

There was Incompatible the idea of détente between US and URSS. According to Brezhnev détente depended on “ *a certain trust and ability to take account the legitimate interests of one another*”<sup>84</sup>, “*The equality of the superpowers and the non-interference in international affairs were détente foundational principles*”<sup>85</sup>. But on the other side Carter had another vision of détente, a broad relaxation in tensions and not the climate of peace based on mutual restraint and equality that Nixon and Brezhnev had built<sup>86</sup>. Carter wanted to make the Soviet-American relationship more comprehensive and more reciprocal taking more from Moscow without giving concessions that his predecessors had made<sup>87</sup>.

In 1979 the negotiations<sup>88</sup> over SALT II were closer to a successful conclusion, but public approval on the Administration job fell to 30 percent<sup>89</sup>. 13 percent of the Americans believed that the country was in a strong position, while 62 percent believed that America was weaker<sup>90</sup>. In America it was spread the belief that with

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<sup>83</sup> DeConcini amendment.

<sup>84</sup> Garthoff, “ Détente and Confrontation”, p 647.

<sup>85</sup> “The outstanding Exploit of the Defenders of Tula: Speech of L. I. Brezhnev”, Pravda, January 19, 1977.

<sup>86</sup> Sargent, “ A Superpower Transformed”, p. 264.

<sup>87</sup> The comprehensive and reciprocal formula was Brzezinski, as explains in “Power and Principles”, p 147-150.

<sup>88</sup> See: Garthoff, “ Detente and Confrontation”

<sup>89</sup> Garthoff, “ Detente and Confrontation”, p 741.

<sup>90</sup> Kaufman, “ The Presidency of James Earl Carter Jr”, p. 151.

SALT II the Soviet Union had achieved military superiority and that the USSR increased its military dominance in the face of US passivity<sup>91</sup>. Debate over SALT-II in the U.S. Congress continued for months<sup>92</sup>.

In June 1979, the SALT II agreement was signed by Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna. The treaty established numerical equality between the two nations in terms of nuclear weapons, it also limited the number of MIRV missiles<sup>93</sup>. The treaty was denounced as a “sellout” to the Soviets, because leave America without defense against a whole range of new weapons not mentioned in the agreement<sup>94</sup>. Even supporters of arms control were less than enthusiastic about the treaty, since it did little to actually control arms.

#### 7.4 China

Soviets were suspicious about the American rapprochement with China, the Soviet assessment and reaction were affected by the nature of the America Chinese relations. Soviet were worried by the semi alignment and quasi alliance with China in the period 1978/80 due to several causes: 1- US sacrifice existing and potential opportunities for improving relations with the Soviet in favor of closer ties with China. 2- the basis for this change was anti Soviet. 3- China gained greater freedom for action against Soviet interests even if not supported by the US. 4- the consequences of military cooperation with American military assistance to China were a source of uncertainty. 5- implication for overall American policy toward the Soviet and the implied American commitment to a long term policy of confrontation<sup>95</sup>.

Chinese and Soviets were aware of the shifting balance between the two points of view within the Carter administration: on one side the Vance's

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<sup>91</sup> Skidmore, “ Reversing Course”, p. 136.

<sup>92</sup> See: Skidmore, “ Reversing Course”, p 129-147.

<sup>93</sup> Missile with multiple and independent nuclear warheads.

<sup>94</sup> Garthoff, “ Detente and Confrontation”

<sup>95</sup> Garthoff, “ Détente and Confrontation”.

evenhanded approach toward the Soviet and China<sup>96</sup>, and on the other the Brzezinski's desire to move into a closer relations with China coupled with a tougher position toward the Soviet Union. President Carter consider the American relations with China " *a central element of our global policy, and China as a key force for global peace*"<sup>97</sup>. In 1978 occurred the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, completing the process that Kissinger set in motion in 1971.

## 7.5 Iran

Shah Pahlavi dominated Iran because of the CIA intervention to overthrow Mossadegh<sup>98</sup>. Pahlavi consider himself as a reformist and a modernizer of the nation<sup>99</sup>. The US- Iran relations were based on the interest in oil and in an anti-communism policy. Carter raising the issue of human rights on the US-Iran relations. Pahlavi responded with more liberalization policy<sup>100</sup>. The President criticized the intelligence community for not foreseen the revolution in Iran<sup>101</sup>. Two were the elements of the failure: the Shah's belief to deal with the oppositions<sup>102</sup>, and the failure vision about Iran revolution prospects<sup>103</sup>. The real problem was

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<sup>96</sup> During 1977 the possibility of an American tilt toward China associated with the question of a developing of a military security relationship and providing American military technology to China. Carter followed and advised no to play the Chinese card by entering into a military security relationship with China, the reason was that Carter had high priority to maintaining détente with the Soviet Union and pursuing SALT 2 agreement and any opening to China would damage the prospects for these objectives.

<sup>97</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977.

<sup>98</sup> The Ajax operation was a covert mission promoted by the UK and the US in 1953 to overturn the democratic regime in Iran ruled by the nationalist government of Mossadegh, that had nationalized the oil industry.

<sup>99</sup> He used the oil revenues to improve education, medical facilities, roads and modern economy for the citizens. liberalized the treatment of women, land reform, students study abroad and invite western business to Iran. Built a large military force in order to defend themselves against Iraq and Soviet expansion

<sup>100</sup> He approved changes in Iranian law, policy, he reorganized the cabinet, released some political prisoners, promised to end to torture, allowed more freedom for the press and political opposition groups and changed law that regulated military prosecution.

<sup>101</sup> Brzezinski, "Power and Principles", p. 367.

<sup>102</sup> the democratic of Mossadegh era, the communists, the Kurds and other ethnic minorities, the mullahs and religious leaders

<sup>103</sup> The importance of religion was supposed to decline in a society entered in a modern age. But the revolution called for the creation of an Islamic constitution, the restoration of the veil, closing the bars

that the Shah reformed his country too quickly and lost the support of the population influenced by the fundamentalistic religion. “ *Irony that Jimmy Carter, the most devoutly religious occupant of the white house in modern times, would be confronted by a religious revolution that neither he nor any advisers adequately anticipated or understood*”<sup>104</sup>.

## 7.6 Afghanistan

When the Shah was in the US for medical recovery, Iranian students took hostages in the US Embassy in Teheran for 444 days. There were a lot of ways in which US could unilaterally punished Iran but all of those actions involved risks for the hostages, and for the Iranian ties to the Soviet. Despite the high cost of keeping hostages, in terms of international reputation and economic sanctions, continued the confrontation with the US but the diplomacy could not solve the problem. At that dead-end point, Carter turned to military force and exercised his responsibilities as commander in chief<sup>105</sup>. For most of his presidency Jimmy Carter was reluctant to use force or to encourage the leaders of others nations to do so<sup>106</sup>. But Carter, despite a persistent desire to serve as an international

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and end contact with foreign businessman that would not happen in a country where citizens were richer, better educated and with more contacts with Western culture.

<sup>104</sup> Strong R. “ Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the making of American Foreign Policy”, p 66.

<sup>105</sup> as commander in chief, carter made two decisions that give some indication about how he would have performed on other occasions when military forces were ordered into action. First, he made it perfectly clear that he took full responsibilities for the mission. The rescue attempt was in that sense directly under his command. This is what he said publicly to the American people after the disaster at the desert one and what he said privately to colonel Bechwith before the mission began, second, though he was fully briefed on the details of the operation and asked questions about the plans, he avoided any micromanagement of the mission once it was under way, he gave the order to go ahead, but did not interfere thereafter, the only minor expectation to this rule was his acceptance of Brzezinski’s recommendation to confirm that cancellation of the mission was Beckwith’s preference. Carter avoided the kind of white house control over operational details that characterized the ford administration handling of the Mayaguez incident, the last minute Kennedy decisions about the Bay of Pigs, and the day to day direction of various aspects of the Vietnam war during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Carter wanted to be commander in chief, but not commander on the scene. Like president bush in the operations against Iraq, carter gave his professional military advisers the freedom to exercise their best judgement in carrying out the presidential orders he gave.

<sup>106</sup> He wanted the us to stay out of the conflict in the horn of Africa and did not encourage the shah to crack down his revolutionary opponents. He did supply arms to afghans rebels after the soviet invasion and issued a stern public warning that the us would use force to defend western economic interests in



peacemaker, has his limits. In the spring of 1980, Khomeini had pushed him to an end of his considerable tolerance. Even the failure rescue mission had the advantage of conveying to the Iranians the important message that the US was willing to the use of force in some circumstances. On April 25, 1980 Carter made a public announcement to the nation revealing that a secret military mission to rescue the American hostages being held in Tehran had failed, a president reluctant to use force decided to do so and eight men died in the Iranian desert, they were military personnel plus one civilian and an Iranian interpreter<sup>107</sup>.

#### 8. *Nixon and Eurocommunism*

In Portugal on 1974 the new government was leaded by a leftist group by Colonel Vasco dos Santos Goncalves<sup>108</sup> and it included communists in the government. In Italy in June 1975 the Communist Party received 33.4% of the vote in local, provincial and regional elections, and in June 1976 had 33.8 % in the national elections<sup>109</sup>. The reason why the principal communist parties in the region were gaining popularity and political strength was because they were adopting a more independent and moderate course. Kissinger and Brezhnev did not pleased the joint statement made by Georges Marchias of the French Communist Party ( PCF) and Enrico Berlinguer of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in Rome in November 1975 that not only supporter a “ *democratic path to socialism*”, but also opposed “ *all foreign intervention*” that is soviet or American interference<sup>110</sup>. On January 1976 Aldo Moro government fell when the press knew that the US Central Intelligence Agency had spent six million dollars to

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the Persian Gulf against any further soviet expansion. But military force for carter was clearly a last resort and not a first choice course in action. In his presidency he would oppose the invasion of Panama , the threatened invasion of Haiti, and the gulf war, believing in all of those cases that diplomacy and peaceful means od resolutions, like the use of economic sanctions, had not been exhausted.

<sup>107</sup> Jimmy Carter: "Address to the Nation on the Rescue Attempt for American Hostages in Iran," April 25, 1980.

<sup>108</sup> On April 1974 the leadership of the Portuguese armed forces deposed the government of Marcello Caetano that had secceded Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, and the new government seemed to be from the right side. But in July General Antonio de Spínola was replaced by Colonel Vasco dos Santos Goncalves.

<sup>109</sup> The political situation in southern Europe was more calm but with a general turn to the left.

<sup>110</sup> “Dichiarazione Comune del PCI e del Partito Comunista Francese”, 15 November 1975.

support anti-communist candidates in the Italian elections<sup>111</sup>. In April Kissinger discouraged the possibility of the PCI to participate in a coalition government in Italy<sup>112</sup>. In July Brezhnev attacked the United States. Great Britain, France and West Germany for putting pressure on the Italian parties to not include PCI in a government coalition by threatening to curtail financial ties<sup>113</sup>. Kissinger supported that if Communist Parties came to power in Western Europe, the NATO alliance “ *could not survive*” and “ *the foundation of our Atlantic security would therefore be eroded*”<sup>114</sup>. Kissinger cited Portugal and Italy because the US “ *we cannot encourage dialogue with Communist Parties within NATO nations*”<sup>115</sup>. “ *The extent to which such a party ( communist) follow the Moscow line is unimportant even if Portugal had followed the Italian model, we would still have been opposed... the impact of an Italian Communist Party that seemed to be governing effectively would be devastating on France and on NATO too*”<sup>116</sup>. If Communist Party would have gained power in Western Europe, the situation would create “ *a shocking change in the established patterns of American policy*”<sup>117</sup>. Kissinger’s restraints on the dangers of communist participation in the government of NATO countries were delimited in many ways. Contacts between American Embassies and local Communist Party members were limited and controlled, but it restricted the diplomatic reporting. The American interests to reduce the Moscow influence in the Communist world movement were subordinated to opposition to Eurocommunism, the fear was that the Eurocommunism could make the Western Communist Parties more attractive for the Western Countries, so the US gave high priority in the defense of the Western Alliance and American influence in it than the rising influence of the Soviets in the east<sup>118</sup>.

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<sup>111</sup> Garthoff, “Détente and Confrontation”, p. 541.

<sup>112</sup> “ Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at Annual Meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors”, April 22. P 567/69.

<sup>113</sup> “Answers by L.I. Brezhnev to questions from a correspondent of Pravda”, Pravda, July 30, 1976.

<sup>114</sup> Binder, “ Kissinger sees NATO end if Europeans elect reds”.

<sup>115</sup> Even though there was a “ fruitful relations” with Titoist Yugoslavia and “parallel policies” with Communist China.

<sup>116</sup> Binder, “Kissinger sees NATO end if Europeans elect reds”.

<sup>117</sup> “ Summary of Kissinger Speech to US ambassador” New York Times April 1976.

<sup>118</sup> Garthoff, “ Detente and Confrontation”, p. 542.

## 9. Carter and Eurocommunism

The new administration reversed course from public opposition to Eurocommunism<sup>119</sup>. The Eurocommunism for the Administration was not a primary theme in foreign policy.

The Eurocommunism was a product of the distention that made possible the evolution of the Communist Parties in Western Europe and also their participation in the European governments. The fact that the NATO declared to be compatible with distention, let PCI to accept the Atlantic Alliance and the CEE<sup>120</sup>. The Carter's Administration declared that it would not interfere in the Italian internal situation, showing to please the support of the Communists in the Italian government<sup>121</sup>, so it began a dialogue with the Communist Parties in the Western Europe, especially with PCI<sup>122</sup>.

In 1975 Peter Lange supported that the American and Italian interests would be better served if the PCI had entered in the Italian government<sup>123</sup>. Richard Gardner did not agree with Lange's ideas, the ambassador believed that PCI was not yet developed to give to it some power in a democratic country, and when he came in Italy he found that the party was still under the influence of a militancy still linked to the Stalinism. The same leadership of the Communist Party was hostile to the politics of human rights by Carter, to the American basis in Italy and to the increasing number of the Italian military expense, especially the one of three per cent requested by the NATO, and to the persistent historical importance of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. PCI, according to Gardner, was not reliable to be in the Italian government<sup>124</sup>.

Carter received much pressures to take a strong position against the participation of the Communists in the Italian government (document 2), but he was decided to not interfere in the internal affairs of his European allies and he

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<sup>119</sup> Gaddis, "Strategies of Containment", p.347.

<sup>120</sup> Irwin Wall, "L'amministrazione Carter e l'Eurocomunismo".

<sup>121</sup> But without a real participation in the government for them.

<sup>122</sup> In order to encourage them to accept the western values.

<sup>123</sup> Peter Lange, "What Is to be done about the Italian Communism", in Foreign Policy, 1975.

<sup>124</sup> Garner, "Mission: Italy".

supported the idea that in every occasion those allies were sovereign nations in which electors had the right to decide how to be ruled<sup>125</sup>.

### *10. On the road to the Italian Provinces*

The Department of State was sure that if the Italian national politics had as core Rome, to better understand it, they had to visit the little town across Italy to meet representatives of the major parties closer to the grass roots. It was an action strategy, used to examine in depth a theme, a situation or a political turning point that emerged in missions in some towns believed to be the litmus test of national inclinations.

It was in Sanremo that the Ligurian DC opened for the first time to the PCI, letting know that the *Compromesso Storico* could arise also in the white strongholds. Brescia and Bergamo were the opposite instead, in the former Catholics watched with interest to the PCI, in the latter this kind of tactic was opposed to the point of defining Bergamo as the Catholic *Vandea*. In Piacenza American diplomats met the faces of a young and pro-western PCI, in Como they experienced what the damages made by political uncertainty could cause to the economic wellness, and in Puglia they came to understand what is going to happen to Moro supporters after their leader passing. The result was a interpretation of Italian politics from the top to the bottom which testified the size and the importance of resources employed to better understand what happening in the bowels of the *Bel Paese*<sup>126</sup>.

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<sup>125</sup> At the beginning of the presidential term, senator Clayborne Pell and the member of the Congress Frank Annunzio wrote a letter the president warning him that PCI had the best opportunity in 25 years to gain control of the government. Both recommended to the administration to support the Italian economy in the crisis and to receive the Prime Minister Andreotti as soon as possible to support him in his decision to oppose to the communist participation. (*Letters from Senator Pell and Congressman Annunzio to President Carter, March 15, 1977*)

<sup>126</sup> Molinari, " *Governo Ombra*".

## 11. Network of relationships with PCI

Carter Administration seemed contrary to every type of contact with PCI, but in reality meeting among communist politicians and American officials in 1978 were very frequent, so telegram by telegram emerged curiosity and often appreciation for the party that Washington did not want to see in the government.

Giorgio Amendola told Berlinguer's strategies to the cultural advisor of the American Embassy Joseph LaPalombra, political analyst at Yale; Sergio Segre told in advance to the American about the visit of Jean Kanapa in Rome; Alfonso Reichlin supposed the weakness of PCI hit by Craxi<sup>127</sup> ( document 3 ) ; the Milan provincial secretary Augusto Castagna described the arrival of the Soviet Consul; Luciano Barca was interested in a "professional exchange"; the historian Giuseppe Boffa stated with fear the possibility of a conspiracy anti PCI; vice president of Foreign Affairs Antonio Rubbi assumed that " *Beijing is buying weapons in Europe*" and Angelo Oliva ( official at the Foreign Affairs) described the new PCI method to the arriving Congress. The great quantity of information gathered by American officials on Botteghe Oscure did not always match with the news from DC, bringing divergences between the Embassy in Rome and the Consulate in Milan. Allen Holmes " Deputy Chief of Mission", diplomat of the biggest degree in Via Veneto signed a long telegram to the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in which he proposed the opening to the PCI " *because it would be in the interests of United States*". ( document 4 )

According to Amendola, PCI forced governmental crisis for several reasons. Firstly, PCI had some problems with its base and CGIL, its dominant labor union. Emergency government and a more efficient executive request on primary necessity issues for workers was an essential tactic to appease the discontentment of its base. Secondly, Andreotti government seemed inefficient and not desirous to launch decisive laws such as law on budget deficit, that according to their valuation fluctuated from thirty billions to thirty five billions. This deficit management made things difficult for PCI and finally government refused

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<sup>127</sup> Telegram, by Alfredo Reichlin to American Diplomat, 7<sup>th</sup> June 1978.

to make necessary reforms for public order, beginning to the question of the police union labor.

Holmes suggested to Washington a political revision and made some concrete examples of counter-productive situations for American interests. The first concerned the alliance with Christian Democrats because that bond involved some disadvantages, portraying America as a factor of Italian national politics that reduced DC failure and overrated its ability to self-reform. The result was that US became a tool of bribery. Washington should admit that a single party perpetuation to the power did not mean having a good democracy. If the excess of tolerance towards DC was the first mistake, the second was the hostility towards PCI that was pushing the whole left wing in communist hands, beginning from socialist party. Holmes believed that PCI could not be considered as a Moscow limb, because PCI revolutionary tradition was not as the Russian one, that Italian communists did not know anything about Russian communism and that its leaders were Marxist intellectuals from West and not from East. Holmes demolished the taboo of the crucial importance of Italy for NATO. He thought that in reality American had given to Italian forces a superior importance that they had. If in the worst case PCI was in the government and it withdrew Italy from NATO, the consequences would not be easy but not dangerous because Italian formation did not make differences in European equilibrium of power. The loss of troops in the Mediterranean sea would be a damage but such as in France case, American would do some adjustment in the troops deployment.

An additional signal of defrosting relationship between PCI and Washington was a telegram by the chief of foreign section of PCI, Sergio Segre, send to an US Embassy official in which it is revealed that the French peer Jean Kanapa was arriving for a visit. Segre underlined how Kanapa did not receive any invitation in Rome but he wanted to discuss with PCI about the French elections. The fact that Segre informed Americans meant that he did not want that Washington could think something that was not. The aim was to take distances from PCF because with its behavior weakened Eurocommunism cause.

## 12. *The Italian Situation*

After the election of Jimmy Carter, Segre met Ted Kennedy but he denied the possibility to have a meeting with Napolitano, but the visit was the beginning of a concrete availability for the dialogue that seemed to be one of the features of the new Democratic Administration<sup>128</sup>. The democratic American public opinion had a particular positive vision toward PCI and it gathered several openings from the liberal intellectuals<sup>129</sup>. An opening toward the Italian communists was already accomplished by the European social democracy by Brandt<sup>130</sup>.

1976 in Italy began with a political crisis: Aldo Moro, the Prime Minister, was optimistic about an opening toward PCI, led by Enrico Berlinguer. The Socialist Party, that supported Moro, did not agree with this political action and decided to not support anymore the government. So DC created a new government only with DC ministers, but a scandal overwhelmed the party<sup>131</sup>.

In the political elections of 1976<sup>132</sup> PCI gained 34.4%<sup>133</sup>, and DC 38.7%, while the Socialist Party only 9.6%. in the end the left block (PCI+PSI+ some minor parties) achieved 45% of the votes, and the centrist block ( DC + Republicans + Social democrats + Liberals ) the same. Without a clear majority the problem was how to form the government. So Andreotti proposed a “ governo della sfiducia” or “ cabinet of abstentions”<sup>134</sup>.

In November 1976, the new President rejected the Realpolitik of the previous Republican Administrations but the influence of Kissinger was clear when Carter

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<sup>128</sup> The role of Giovanni Agnelli in order to give credibility to the PCI in the western world is recognized by Segre in “L’Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer”, p.173.

<sup>129</sup> Lange, “ What is to be done about Italian Communism?”, in Foreign Policy n.21 winter 1975/76.

<sup>130</sup> Brandt in an interview in Der Spiegel, on 26th January 1976, claimed some opening toward PCI.

<sup>131</sup> On American newspapers appeared some news about funding from the US to DC officials such as Andreotti and Cattin, and then the Lockheed Scandal with the accusation to some Italian politics to get some bribe to buy some military transport aircraft. Due to this scandal Moro resigned and the President of the Republic dissolved Parliament.

<sup>132</sup> The first elections in which the age to vote was decreased from 21 to 18.

<sup>133</sup> In the administrative and regional elections in 1975, PCI gained 33% of the votes with only 3points left from the DC. PCI after these elections ruled five regions ( Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Piemonte, Liguria) and the main cities ( Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin and Genova).

<sup>134</sup> It was so-called because different parties claimed the abstention, including the Communists, that lasted still 1978.

stated that *“further cooperation between the DC and the PCI would raise serious doubts about Italy’s military role within the Atlantic Alliance and would create a climate unfavorable to the maintenance of the US military presence” in Italy*<sup>135</sup>. On the other hand the new administration had some differences with the democratic approach of Kissinger in fact it gave the possibility to some PCI members to obtain visas to enter in the US (Napolitano)<sup>136</sup>. However this political move, there was no significant change in US government dealing with the PCI . Brzezinski, considered the drift to the left in Italy *“potentially the gravest problem we now have in Europe”*<sup>137</sup> . On 14 March, the State Department released a long memorandum, reaffirming that: *“We prefer that our friends and allies be governed by political parties with strong democratic traditions, values, and practices. Naturally, we are concerned about the willingness and ability of Communist parties which do not share these traditions, values, and practices, to cooperate with us and other members of Western community on fundamental political, economic and security issues”*<sup>138</sup>. Carter, followed the same line preferring that *“all the governments in Europe continued to be democratic and that no totalitarian element became influential or dominant”*<sup>139</sup>. In a visit in Washington to the president, Andreotti<sup>140</sup> claimed that the PCI had *“changed: there is not any more manifestation against NATO, and the Army is backed by the party”*<sup>141</sup>. But the US government had some doubts, in fact even if the United States would not interfere in Italian domestic policies, they could not be *“indifferent to the outcome”* of political changes<sup>142</sup>. DC would not increase its dependence on Communist cooperation but in reality it depended on the PCI abstention and the American feared that this cooperation would make acceptable the Communist presence in Italian government.

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<sup>135</sup> Implications of the Communist/Christian Democratic Accommodation in Italy, 2 December 1976.

<sup>136</sup> After the deny of the visa in 1975, he obtained a new one in 1976.

<sup>137</sup> Brzezinski, “ Power and Principles”.

<sup>138</sup> Gardner, “ Mission Italy” , p. 423/30

<sup>139</sup> Jimmy Carter: "European Newspaper Journalists - Question-and-Answer Session.," April 25, 1977.

<sup>140</sup> Who ruled in a government helped by the PCI abstention.

<sup>141</sup> Gardner, “Mission Italy” p 139.

<sup>142</sup> Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, July 23 1977.



At the beginning of 1977 the communist problem in Western Europe identified with the PCI initiative. It was the main Western communist party and the only one with an increasing electoral consensus. It was also the only Communist Party to have an access in the government in the western block with also some power in it. One of the cornerstone of the policy of Carter was the principle of no interference that seemed to announce a change in the American veto toward PCI. The new administration action was between a dialogue without prejudices and at the same time a traditional vision of the Eurocommunism as a threat for NATO<sup>143</sup>. According to Gardner the administration wanted to hold a different position from the one of Ford and Kissinger but it did not justify the abandon of the American objections a role of the PCI in the government<sup>144</sup>. On the memorandum of 3<sup>rd</sup> November 1976 where Carter exposed his priority on his foreign policy he stated counterproductive the absence of contacts of the American Embassies with the left oppositions in Italy and Spain, because even if the US did not have to favor the access to the power to the communist party, it would have to face that perspective. The vision of the American policy toward the Eurocommunism was not only isolated to the no interference and to a major respect of the Italian internal context, but it was insert in a vision that wanted to create an interaction between the democratic evolution of PCI and the development in the Soviet block. It was a strategic action different from the one of Kissinger, who identified the addition of PCI in the western system as an interest and not a problem for the US also considering the consequences on the assets of the eastern Europe and the challenge to the USSR leadership on the communist world<sup>145</sup>. The distinction between no intervention and no indifference that characterized the American policy making toward Italy would have not create a total change on the position on PCI<sup>146</sup>. The idea of Brzezinski was to keep the communists out from the government in order to favor its evolution. According to Brzezinski the inclination of the communist movement toward a destalinization and deleninization should

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<sup>143</sup> Irving Wall, *The Carter Administration and the Eurocommunism*.

<sup>144</sup> Gardner, "Mission: Italy", p 31.

<sup>145</sup> Pons, "Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo", p 95.

<sup>146</sup> Njolstad, "Come tenere i comunisti fuori dal governo senza ingerenze: l'amministrazione Carter e l'Italia", p 57/84.

have encouraged and that these inclination were already advanced in PCI but the participation in the government should have not favored it, on the contrary it should have been delayed these inclinations<sup>147</sup>. On the contrary the Soviets supported that the entrance of PCI in the government could have reinforced its heterodox positions. In the view of this argument began the stiffening of Brzezinski in March 1977 when he specified to the president that Italy would be the main European problem for the US<sup>148</sup>. The choice to expand the contacts with the communist leaders left an open door for a development of the situation and it depended also on the PCI orientations.

The two major parties were in crisis<sup>149</sup>. DC was searching unity and cohesion, Moro looked for an equilibrium between a party to preserve in its integrity and a new way to ride. The Compromesso Storico was in part the effect of the crisis of the two protagonists. The Lockheed scandal blasted, Dc lost consensus. To exit from the crisis Forlani proposed new elections while Moro thought to a coalition with PCI. If the US gave the impression to accept the participation of the communist in the government , in a few day they would be in the coalition. Italy needed from Washington clear signs.

### *13. The turning point of 12 January 1978*

In January 1978 the PCI threat to end its support to the Cabinet of abstentions, DC could have dissolve Parliament and ask for new elections to find a compromise with PCI. In a meeting between Ambassador Gardner and members of the State Department, the CIA, the White House and the NSC, and the result was that the PCI had not yet evolved completely towards democracy and was still based on Leninist and Stalinist principles. For these reasons, the group considered for the reaffirmation of US opposition to any government that included Communist elements<sup>150</sup>. On 12<sup>th</sup> January 1978 John Trattner, the

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<sup>147</sup> Brzezinski, " Power and Principles".

<sup>148</sup> Brzezinski, " Power and Principles", p 312.

<sup>149</sup> Lanaro, "Storia dell'Italia", p 442/46.

<sup>150</sup> Presidential Review Committee Meeting, January 11, 1978.

spokesman of the State Department, was categorical in stating that Washington would not view with favor the PCI's participation in government. the State Department declaration had a mixed effect. It removed any ambiguities about the US attitude, particularly the notion that the Carter Administration was softer towards Italian Communism than its predecessor had been<sup>151</sup>.

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<sup>151</sup> Despite to grant visas for the Italian Communists and some deep contacts with some of them in Italy, the attitude of the US toward the Italian Communists did not change over the administrations. The strategies elaborated by the National Security adviser ( Brzezinski) and the US Embassy in Rome ( Gardner) were the same of their predecessors Volpe and Kissinger.

## Chapter II

### The Italian Situation

#### 1. *A Panoramic of the Italian Sixties*

At that time, Kissinger was very active in the European and in the Middle-East scenery. The American Secretary of State had a totally negative judgment of the center-left, because he had a Metternich vision of Europe and compared the Italian situation to the Renaissance. Indeed, the last outcomes of the coalition with socialists revealed a different scenario from the one he hoped for: the openness to the left force, instead of isolating the communists, helped them in making the PCI the only party of the opposition<sup>1</sup>. Kissinger was very interested in the Italian internal situation, because he believed that the international relations had to conflict with Italian politics, in particular with Moro's visions and his attitudes<sup>2</sup>. In the 1960s, Italian foreign policy was often insecure due to the instability of the government, which had to deal with both the Atlantic and the community issues. Italy reflected the impact of the rivalry in the Mediterranean Sea that could have interfered with Kissinger's plan of global stabilization. Various elements were involved in the strategy of tension and in the American Interventionism; these elements often worsened the clash between formations and opposing groups<sup>3</sup>.

According to Paul Ginsborg, "*the more we think of the '70s, the more we drift apart from that decade which becomes more disquieting*"<sup>4</sup>. Various elements destabilized the Italian political system. First of all, the deepness and the gravity of the economic crisis and, in addition, Italy was hit by a wave of conflictual international interests coming from the Mediterranean areas. Lastly, the spiral of brutalities and conspiracies realized to stiffen the Italian political system had

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<sup>1</sup> H. Kissinger, "Gli anni della Casa Bianca", 1980, p. 94-95.

<sup>2</sup> He was Minister of the Foreign Affairs from August 1969 to July 1972 and from July 1973 to November 1974 always in governments of center left.

<sup>3</sup> E. Santarelli, "Storia critica dell Repubblica, L'Italia dal 1945 al 1994", p. 223.

<sup>4</sup> M.D'Alema, P. Ginsborg, "Dialogo su Berlinguer", 1994, p 56.

actually destabilized it<sup>5</sup>. The economic instability overlapped with the instability of coalitions. Differently from twenty years (1948-68) that was characterized by a definite shifting from De Gasperi's centrism<sup>6</sup> with some unicolor variation to the center left, the hegemonic party exhausted all the possible formulas, trying with governments of national solidarity supported in Parliament by unthinkable strategies and opening the dialogue with PCI that by its side with Berlinguer<sup>7</sup> proposed the *Compromesso Storico*<sup>8</sup>. The grade of instability was not only due to the succession of different governments, but also to the signs of the electoral absenteeism and to the referendum trial, which put in crisis the force lines acquired by the government party and by the left opposition<sup>9</sup>. Nevertheless the economic and institutional difficulties and their impact on the political society of the movements, the power of the DC and the persistence of the convention ad *excludendum*<sup>10</sup> toward PCI continued to be the predominant elements.

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<sup>5</sup> E. Santarelli, "Storia critica della Repubblica", Universale Economica Feltrinelli, p. 211

<sup>6</sup> In 1948 the Cold War between the Western Democracies and the Communist block was already began. In Italy, the same year won the elections DC defeating the social communist Popular Front. Alcide De Gasperi was per the fifth time Prime Minister, in a coalition government with liberals, republicans and social democrats. It was the birth of Centrism led by De Gasperi.

<sup>7</sup> Berlinguer was a son of the democratic bourgeoisie that chose the communist militia and this fact made Togliatti very pleased. ( F, Barbagallo, " Enrico Berlinguer", Carrocci, p.13.

<sup>8</sup> The expression *Compromesso Storico* was born in 1973 after a reflection on the experience of the fascist Golpe in Chile by the communist leader group. The *Compromesso Storico* was a long-term strategy elaborated by PCI since 1964, it was also known as the Italian way towards socialism. After Togliatti's death, a great number of young communists were attracted by the impact of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and by the working class struggles. After 1968, the PCI lived two different tendencies, on one side, it capitalized the social influence from the students' movement, on the other side, it lost some hegemony during the formation of the new working class. For the first time, the working class struggles were autonomous from the union labor direction and from the party. In the middle of the 1970s the problematic relations between working class and party were always present. The party tried to re-build its role in the factories, but the problem was radical for the communist. The PCI tried to create a new group composed by young workers and immigrates, but since they were strangers to the political communist tradition, to the productive myth created by Gramsci and to the state culture of the official movement, the PCI began to lose control of the struggles. In order to solve the issues of the extremists, the PCI adopted a policy of alliance with middle class. 1973 represented a year of divarication between the vanguard working class and the party. For the former, the occupation of Mirafiori was decisive, and the latter received an opposing signal from the Golpe in Chile: it was not possible to argue with bourgeoisie.

<sup>9</sup> E. Santarelli, *ibidem*, p. 212.

<sup>10</sup> It is an explicit agreement or a tacit understanding among some political, social, or economic parties, which had the aim of excluding a determined third part from an alliance, participation or collaboration. The locution was created in the 1960s by the politician and jurist Leopoldo Elia, with the aim of prohibiting several political forces (especially DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI, PRI) to consider the PCI as a possible democratic force of government.

Considering the different elections (administrative, regional, parliamentary, referendum and European ), a certain pattern emerged:

- 1) during the administrative elections in 1971 and the political elections in 1972 there was a push towards the right forces;
- 2) in the middle of the '70s, the tendency was totally leading towards left, as shown by the referendum about divorce (1974) and the regional elections of 1975;
- 3) there was a period of balance with the political vote of 1976 in which PCI gained ground, but DC confirmed its supremacy;
- 4) the inversion of the trend of PCI and the beginning of its decline during the political and European elections of 1979<sup>11</sup>.

The whole political activity of the third legislature<sup>12</sup> was characterized by the openness to the left force. This overture by the government took place in the period in which there were some hesitations among the various schools of thoughts<sup>13</sup> in the parties. The natural opponents of this new vision were the communists and the forces of the economic-right<sup>14</sup>. The former saw the openness to the left force as a threat to their power and thought that their reformation policy would have tried to fight and to reduce their power and influence<sup>15</sup>. The reasons of communists' opposition to the center-left were more complex. PCI never hid its ambitions of becoming the only delegation for the working class instead of against PSI, so their relations had always been affected by this competition. When Catholics and Socialists started a dialogue, not only PCI lost an important ally, but also ran the risk of losing some electoral positions. PSI aimed to create new possibilities of progress and to gain the favor of the working class by isolating

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<sup>11</sup> E. Santarelli, *ibidem* p. 213

<sup>12</sup> 1958-1963, the new majority, made of socialists and Catholics was created for the first time in 1962, four years after the election of 1958.

<sup>13</sup> Within DC and PSI there were several currents, stronger in terms of influence than in terms of numbers, opposed to the openness to the left operation.

<sup>14</sup> G. Mammarella, " L'Italia Contemporanea: Storia d'Italia dall'unità alla repubblica", V volume, Il Mulino. P. 248.

<sup>15</sup> The campaign led against the alliance of socialist and catholic though the press, interest groups and the representatives of the economic interests in the conservative parties and in the one of majority witnessed the worries spread on the consequences of the new policy.

PCI. Due to the interest that the dialogue between PSI and DC was creating in various sectors of the country, PCI's hostile attitude towards the center-left could have raised a certain disappointment even among its supporters<sup>16</sup>. For this reason PCI acquired a holding attitude which gradually became an always more explicit opposition towards the center-left force in the moment it had to deal with the first difficulties.

Since the end of the '50s, almost all Italian parties and in particular the mass parties suffered a decrease in the number of members and a separation from those organizations created to act as mediators between the party and the electorate. PCI was the only force among the mass parties to have preserved a traditional program and a unitary direction, so it expressed some concerns. The most relevant fact was the change in PCI's political position towards the Soviet Union<sup>17</sup>. On one side, Italian communists rejected the principles of Kremlin, but, on the other side, the Italian way to socialism was giving insufficient results. PCI declared to accept the plurality of parties, even though they should have been limited to those willing to cooperate in the creation of a socialist society. This openness to the democratic method was in contrast with the internal situation of PCI<sup>18</sup>. In the middle of the '60's the dialogue within PCI was characterized by a tendency to a new openness. In April 1965, the Central Committee exhorted the non-communist left parties to form a new democratic majority<sup>19</sup>. This proposal reflected the contrast between Ingrao's thesis – in favor of the dialogue with the Catholic left force - and Amendola's one, who wanted the formation of a unique left party in order to surpass the Leninist social-democratic experience. Communists proposed to create a confederation of left parties, but socialists and social democrats rejected the idea, because they saw it as an attempt to repropose the Popular Front under another name, but, actually, it represented

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<sup>16</sup> Mammarella, "L'Italia contemporanea" 5 volume, p. 251.

<sup>17</sup> It began with the Hungarian crisis of 1956 and from the Kruscev's condemnation of Stalin's crime, but it sharpened at the beginning of 1960s as a consequence of the politics of the Italian way to socialism whose PCI entrusted the task to break the political isolation in which it was since 1947.

<sup>18</sup> According to Longo, the debate about the solution of the problem was focusing on the right way to establish an internal regime in a revolutionary party made by the working class. The regime should have been completely democratic and, at the same time, it should have reassured the need for unity in the party's orientation, political ideas and actions.

<sup>19</sup> Mammarella, *ibidem*, p. 301.

PCI's need of establishing new relations with other political forces<sup>20</sup>. The issue about creating relationships with the other forces gave birth to much harder contrasts within the PCI and, in the same time, the party started having serious organizational difficulties. PCI had to choose between Ingrao's and Amendola's proposals<sup>21</sup>, and, in the context of a campaign against the center-left, the communist party had to try to establish a sort of convergence with the forces of the majority, Catholics and Socialists. This kind of policy brought several good results to the PCI, but it was in contrast with the Chinese wing and the increasing proliferation of dissident groups inspired by Mao, Trotsky, Guevara<sup>22</sup>.

## 2. 1968 Movements

The wave of 1968 was not suddenly born. The first struggles against the power occurred in 1966/67 in the form occupation of Universities. Subsequently, the Italian Students Union started a gradual radicalization, while in the civil society several spontaneous groups were born<sup>23</sup> /<sup>24</sup>. In Italy, the student protest<sup>25</sup> took strength from the French example. In the post-war period, the university population doubled, reaching a half million students, but university facilities were still insufficient and backward. Just in the university of Rome, it was possible to count seventy thousands students: it was the biggest concentration of students in the world. The issues of the temporary work, of the commuters, of the student-workers and of the migrants to the north contributed to the lack of socialization

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<sup>20</sup> Mammarella, *ibidem*, p. 301.

<sup>21</sup> See the paragraph Ingrao vs Amendola.

<sup>22</sup> In the end of 1966, a small part of communist dissidents, already out of PCI, gathered in Livorno to create the Italian Marxist-Leninist Party referring to those principles affirmed forty-five years earlier in the same city, in the act of the constitution of the Italian communist Party. The new party was small, without great leaders and destined to get confuse with other rioting political groups. This phenomenon spread out in the end of 1960s when the apparition of the left of PCI and an increasing number of political groups gave birth to the protest movement of 1968.

<sup>23</sup> F. Catalano, "I Movimenti studenteschi e la scuola in Italia. 1938/1968", 1969.

<sup>24</sup> In February 1969 there was the first occupation of the Sapienza University in Pisa. The movement was born between the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1968 and featured Trento, Turin, Pisa (the leader city) Milan, Venice, Florence, Rome and Naples. The protest against the university fees spread in the Sacro Cuore Univeristy, while the protest against the Law Gui spread in the minor universities of the south.

<sup>25</sup> The phenomenon began in Berkley, California, in 1964 and spread mainly in America and the capitalistic Europe.



and politicization of the movement<sup>26</sup>. It had a huge potential because it included students and factory workers. The main topics in 1968 were the egalitarianism, the anti-imperialism, a certain common catholic radicalism, the rebellion against fathers and institutions, the criticism of everyday life. According to Tarrow<sup>27</sup>, the 1968 archives were places rich of documentation thanks to the richness of the press in the hands of the extra parliamentary left force, which was not compatible with other experiences. When the occupations started, the symbols, the images and the words of the movement were registered. In this period the radical left culture prevailed, indeed, the 1968 was the year of the formation of new political subjects, such as the group of Il Manifesto or the Left Communism, whose newspaper (1971) represented the main point of confrontation for the other more or less contemporary tendencies as well<sup>28</sup>.

1968 and 1969 were the years in which the protest phenomenon belonging to the social and political reality of the western countries spread. Egalitarianism and anti-authoritarianism were the main goals of a research which was first cultural and then political. The modernity of communism laid on a utopian communism to be built by using little-known models able to keep their grip and to criticize the modern industrial society. The ideology of the New Left<sup>29</sup> was based on these two fundamental elements. The most significant episode of the European youth contestation was the Revolution of May in France in 1968 during which students, workers and people of every class gathered to protest and blocked France for several weeks, putting De Gaulle's regime at risk. Europe interpreted the events of May in France as signs of the political and spiritual crisis spreading all over the Old World<sup>30</sup>. Some observers think that the causes of the European frustration are its isolation and its search for a new identity and a new role. The events of

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<sup>26</sup> R. Rossanda, "L'anno degli studenti", 1969; L. Magri, "Considerazioni sui fatti di maggio", 1968.

<sup>27</sup> He is a professor of political science and sociology and he is known for his research in the areas of comparative politics, social movements, political parties, collective actions and political sociology. His first area of interest was the study of communism in the 1960s.

<sup>28</sup> A. Garzia, "Da Natta a Natta. Storia del Manifesto e del PDUP" 1985.

<sup>29</sup> Mammarella, *ibidem*, p.322

<sup>30</sup> Mammarella, *ibidem*, p. 322.

Prague of the same year were the confirmation of the European impotence and isolationism.

## 2.1 *The Prague Spring*

In January 1968 Antonin Novotny<sup>31</sup> resigned from the role of President of the Czechoslovakia Republic, and representative of the communist orthodoxy. The election of Alexander Dubcek (already leader of the Slovakian Communist Party and one of the most popular progressive leaders) as secretary of the party, signed the beginning of a process of liberalization of methods and institutions that, in a short time, opened the Czechoslovakian political life to always larger relations. This made the Czechoslovakian policy different from the ones of the other European Communist countries. The Prague Spring from a national fact became a European fact; Prague was seen as an experiment that could have created a new type of socialism in which liberty and democracy conditions could coexist<sup>32</sup>. But the process of liberalization of the Czechoslovakian communism contrasted with the situation of the communist regimes in the other countries of Eastern Europe. If the Prague experiment would have spread also in the other countries of the Soviet Block<sup>33</sup>, the Soviet Union would have lost its ideological guide of communism and the political control over Eastern Europe, while the leaders in Moscow, Budapest, Warsaw and Berlin would have been dunking in a popular protest. This was the reason why Moscow and the other satellites began a political pressure on the Czechoslovakian government in order to arrest the liberalization, but when the pressures had little effects, the Soviet leaders resorted to military intervention. As justification of this intervention having as purpose the restoration of the Soviet authority and leadership, Breznev reaffirmed

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<sup>31</sup> He was a communist since 1921. In 1941, he was arrested by the Germans and deported in the Mauthausen concentration camp. Among the communist exponents, he emerged after the Second World War, during the Slansky purge in 1951, when he became chief of the organization of the party and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. With the death of Zapotocky, he bonded this position with the one of the President of the Republic until 1964. His direction of the party of the country corresponded to the Stalinian epoch. In 1968 Dubcek became secretary of the party.

<sup>32</sup> Mammarella, *ibidem* p. 324.

<sup>33</sup> In some countries, such as Poland, there were the right conditions for it to occur.

Moscow's right to intervene in the internal situations of the countries under the communist regime. By doing so, he declared that the doctrine of limited sovereignty<sup>34</sup> was going to be the basis of the Soviet policy in Eastern Europe.

The first of a series of difficult problems that PCI had to deal with in 1968 was the Prague Spring and the invasion of the Czechoslovakia<sup>35</sup> by the troops of the Warsaw Pact. Prague was not Budapest<sup>36</sup>, Dubcek was not Gero<sup>37</sup> nor Nagy<sup>38</sup>. The attempt of reforming was decided by the majority of the Communist Party and supported by the majority of the militia and the people. Its aim was not to suppress the socialist system, nor to break the international alliances and the relationships with the Soviet Union, but to give to socialism a new political asset: more tolerant towards any dissent and less centralistic in the management of the

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<sup>34</sup> The Breznev doctrine, known also as limited sovereignty doctrine, was the Soviet foreign policy introduced by Breznev in a speech held at the fifth congress of the Polish unified working class party in 1968. Any nation could have left the Warsaw Pact, nor disturb the equilibrium of the regime with a unique party in the countries belonging to the Eastern Block. It was a clear message prevent the intervention by the Atlantic Pact in the policy of the countries belonging to the Soviet influence.

<sup>35</sup> To the brothers parties: the extraordinary XIV Congress of the Czechoslovakia Communist Party addresses to the working class and communist parties all over the world with this important message: the principles of the sovereignty and national independence represents the fundamental requirement of any way to socialism. But the blind act of some bureaucratized leaders groups, that substitute the theoretical argumentation in the disputes on the conception of socialism with the brute force of cannons and tanks, steps on all the most fundamental principles on Marxism and Internationalism. The hegemony tendencies of great power, hidden behind the worries for the internal Czechoslovakian situation and with the struggle against the phantom invented by the anti-revolution, threats to compromise Marxism and Socialism. So I publically condemn, in front of the working class and to the working masses, which you represented the interests, the brutal and cynical military intervention acting beyond our interest in yours. Support our right cause and let know your opinion to the direction of that parties that, with the military intervention, tries to overthrow the rebirth of socialism in the Rscs and the restoration of Stalinian's empire. We exhort all of you in this situation, not to participate in the conferences of the communist and worker parties prepared for this Autumn in Moscow; to consider if, continuing the already in progress policy, the directions of the Soviet Communist Party and of the other interventionist countries were to include for the future among the Marxist and revolutionary parties. This appeal has been approved by the extraordinary XIV Congress (it was undercover) of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. It was not made public in order no to compromise the position of the Czechoslovakian leaders during their stay in Moscow in order to conduct negotiations.

<sup>36</sup> The Hungarian revolution in 1956 was an anti-Soviet armed uprising blasted in the socialist Hungary that lasted from 23<sup>rd</sup> October to 11<sup>th</sup> November 1956. Initially contrasted by the Hungarian secret policy, it was, in the end, repressed by the armed intervention of the Soviet troops. This revolution brought a minor support in the Bolshevism's idea in the western countries.

<sup>37</sup> He was a communist leader and then leader of Hungary. In 1956 he was forced by the Soviet Politburo to dismiss with the accusation to not be able to handle the revolution.

<sup>38</sup> He was a landmark of a movement which aim was to open the country towards the west (he wanted to exit from the Warsaw Pact) and towards some principles of the liberal democracy.

economy<sup>39</sup>. It was not to be considered as a new declaration of force by the revolution, as but a brand new start for the popular democracy<sup>40</sup> imagined by Dimitrov<sup>41</sup>, which with Stalin's support obtained good results. Dubcek affirmed to move in the direction indicated by the XX Congress and in the meeting with Breznev they had an agreement<sup>42</sup>. The only risk was that allies could take position against this attempt starting a policy of isolation. The Soviet Union intervened with military forces because of the fear that Czechoslovakian attempt could result successful and could inspire other countries - the Soviet Union as well - to proceed in that way and ask for the promises and the reforms needed. The invasion was not a mistake, nor a limit of the national independence, but the denial of the idea of "unity in the diversity". It was a way to deny the creation of options different from socialism in a dialogue against imperialism. The invasion was the reaffirmation of the leader party and of the limited sovereignty. Because of this, all the communist parties all over the world had different reactions about the Czechoslovakian crisis. The intervention was accepted by the communist parties of Syria, Chile, Cuba and Vietnam (because they needed the Soviet help), while the communist parties of France, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Romania, India, Morocco, Australia, Yugoslavia and China expressed an explicit dissent. PCI's reaction was very clear: Longo, during the Moscow Conference in 1969, abstained from voting the final motion. Some of the other leaders (Amendola and Pajetta) did not agree with Longo's abstention and introduced the theory of the "correctable mistake" and they stated that such a mistake would not erode the solidarity towards the Soviet Union and the confidence on its future<sup>43</sup>. It was only an illusion that the break between the Czechoslovakian dissidents and Moscow could be the right thing to do, actually, the direction taken was leading to the restauration, and the rest of the world

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<sup>39</sup> From a certain point of view, the most extremist idea was to leave some space to the market, without giving up to the planning and to active exchange with foreign countries.

<sup>40</sup> It was a government form created in the aftermath of the Second World War in the eastern countries of Europe belonging to the Soviet influence. The word was used for the first time by Tito and then by Dimitrov because it underlined a difference from the proletarian democracy of the soviet type. In the popular democracy, the communists were at the power in coalitions with other popular parties.

<sup>41</sup> He was a prime minister of the Popular Republic of Hungary.

<sup>42</sup> Magri, "Il sarto di Ulm", p. 243.

<sup>43</sup> Magri, "Il Sarto di Ulm", p. 224.

stayed silent. It could have been the right occasion to intervene as an active force in the international communist movement in order to build the diversity in the unity. But the rest of the world was quite busy: the Americans had to deal with the Vietnam war; the Chinese had to deal with the extremists of the cultural revolution; after Che's death in Cuba, the illusion of the fire guerilla vanished all over America Latina; after the Yom Kippur war, Nasser fostered an Arab anti-colonialism nationalism but not an Islamic one Islamist; lastly, in USSR there were some difficulties with economic results. According to Magri, this was the right time to use the prestige of PCI in order to open a confrontation. However, the Prague affair had some consequences in Italy as well. The youth movement did not dedicated so much attention to this theme, because the real socialism was not worthy of confidence. Psiup sympathized with the Soviet tanks; the intellectuals, the Catholics and the Socialists were not emotionless about the theme, and the democrats used the issue as their anti-communist alibi. Among the communists, there was a duplicity between what they said and what they thought. After many years spent in the belief that Communism could win in the whole world, now they believed that it would finally have raised in Italy, but not in the rest of the world as they dreamt<sup>44</sup>.

The Prague Spring gave to the Italian communists the illusion that their democratic communist model could be exportable in the countries of the "real socialism"<sup>45</sup>. For the PCI the democratic choice was more important than the bond with the Soviet Union, even if they tried to safeguard both of them and Longo chose to stand by Dubcek's and the PCC side. Longo saw the Czechoslovakian experience as model for the renewal of communism in the countries of real socialism. He saw it as a "*strong incentive to overcome the hesitations that still prevent the development of the socialist democracy*"<sup>46</sup>. Longo considered the attempt to introduce some liberties and the democracy in the communisms of the Eastern countries as a demonstration of the feasibility of the transformation supported by PCI. Longo's trip to Prague in order to manifest to Dubcek the

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<sup>44</sup> Magri, *ibidem*, p. 245.

<sup>45</sup> F. Barbagallo, *ibidem*, p. 96.

<sup>46</sup> Longo, "E' ora di Cambiare", in L'Unità, 28 Marzo 1968.

solidarity of the Italian communists towards the development of the socialist democracy, underlined the distance between the two different ways of interpreting the prospective and of the construction of a socialist society<sup>47</sup>.

The French May and the Prague Spring had strong consequences in Italy. The former gave a new characterization to the Italian student movement, which became more concrete during the fighting. After 1968, a part of the student movement merged in the extra-parliamentary communist groups, finding more ground in the union labor struggle and gaining a collocation in the extreme left of the political orientation. The latter, instead, created in Italy a much stronger repercussion than in the other countries, because the political consequences of the event marked the position of the single parties, influencing the reciprocal relations. The president of the Republic and his government<sup>48</sup> condemned the Soviet intervention. PCI, after the statement of the dissidents, criticized the intervention judging it inexcusable<sup>49</sup> during a Parliament meeting. In reality, the dissent of PCI was limited to the Soviet intervention. They didn't want to involve in the condemn the traditional relations linking Czech Republic with the Soviet Union, since they still recognized in the latter its role as leader of the socialism standing at basis of the party. Some observers who ignored the internationalist needs of PCI, judged their standpoint insufficient, and, after the overcoming of the Czechoslovakian events, they recognized that PCI had accomplished another step on the way of autonomy and on the Italian way of socialism theorized in 1956. The condemn of the General Confederation of Work was clearer, indeed they judged the military intervention inadmissible and rejected the invitation by the Soviet Labor Union to take part in a meeting in Moscow. The traditional anti-communist spirit of some political forces, from social democrats to liberals, started up again and, nevertheless the socialist part of PSU condemned the Soviet intervention and criticized the attitude of PCI, the Czechoslovakian episode

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<sup>47</sup> Pajetta, "Le crisi che ho vissuto: Budapest, Praga, Varsavia", Editori Riuniti, Roma. 1982, p.113.

<sup>48</sup> Also the Chamber, gathered on 29<sup>th</sup> August in an extraordinary session, approved the agenda with the vote of the center-left parties (except the trends of the socialism of Lombardia that did not participate in the vote) and liberals.

<sup>49</sup> During the Central Committee, the leadership of PCI had found some justifications and stated that the Dubcek's experiment gained the sympathy among the intellectuals and the PCI leadership, without any blame and without omitting to fight tendencies or pressures or hostile activities.

slowed down the unification process and increased social democrats' ancient suspects and hesitations towards a complete integration with socialists.

### 3. *Ingrao vs Amendola*

On 11 November 1961, during a discussion of the Central Committee, a split in the tradition of the party occurred. Pietro Ingrao did not attack Togliatti's tendency as the other exponents of the left did<sup>50</sup>. Aldo Natoli asked for an extraordinary congress. Other leaders of the Italian regions, such as Emilia and Toscana, expressed heavy criticisms towards Stalinism, USSR and PCI's delays in the construction of the Italian way to socialism<sup>51</sup>. Togliatti was in minority and he threatened to become the leader of a pro-soviet group if the others would have created an anti-Soviet group<sup>52</sup>.

Amendola's attack underlines his tendency to try to push PCI towards an alliance with PSI. This tendency spread out in the regions where the party ruled together with local authorities, but it received heavy oppositions coming from different sectors of PCI. The internal crash of PCI was the proof that it was not possible to separate from USSR. It was impossible not only because of the fear of losing a strong slice of the party, but also because Togliatti did not want to break bonds with PCUS and a lot of leaders believed that those bonds were a guarantee to avoid the danger of a social democracy<sup>53</sup>.

Ingrao believed that the party had to create more bonds with the reality of factory workers and he based all his political action on this idea. The party had to create a connection with the class struggle in factories and also to deal with the "lotta rivendicativa". Amendola did not agree with the idea that the party had

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<sup>50</sup> "I think I have seen, during the central committee's discussion, a clear attack towards Togliatti. The real meaning and the political program of that attack are not clear to me. Honestly, I am afraid that that critic assumed the right sign. And I do not like it" ( P. Ingrao, " le cose impossibili: un'autobiografia raccontata e discussa in Nicola Tranfaglia", Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1990, p. 102.

<sup>51</sup> Central Committee 10-11 November 1961, p. 288.

<sup>52</sup> G. Fiori, " Vita di Enrico Berlinguer", Laterza, Roma/Bari, 1989, p. 118.

<sup>53</sup> That is to say, the danger of abandoning the socialist perspective and the reduction of the workers moved to a subaltern function in a bourgeois government system", Togliatti, discorsi parlamentari, 1952/64, seduta del 5 marzo 1962, camera dei deputati, 1984, vol 2 p 1231

to deal with what the union labor was not able to do because, in that way, its actions would have been limited. Novella, the secretary of CGIL, was worried about the engagement of the party in the world of factories, because it could have created a sort of competition between the party and the union labor. Luciano Lama declared: “we do not want a party of the factories but a party in the factories”<sup>54</sup>.

Berlinguer criticized Ingrao’s position underlying the fact that it was not possible for the reforming actions to start over from the factories<sup>55</sup>.

During the XI congress of PCI, the internal divergences among the communist leaders led to a contrast between Amendola and Ingrao.

According to Alfredo Reichlin<sup>56</sup>, as reported in an article he wrote on *Il Manifesto* to celebrate Ingrao’s 100<sup>th</sup> birthday, Ingrao’s ideology overcame Togliatti’s because they had a different view of the Italian case; actually Ingrao’s ideology was a variation of Togliatti’s ideology. In fact, Ingrao’s ideology was born from the split of Togliatti’s group, which split into three different trends even before the death of its leader<sup>57</sup>. Definitively emarginated, Pietro Secchia’s<sup>58</sup> followers, representing the new generation of the party leadership, split into a right faction guided by Giorgio Amendola (Chiaromonte, Valenzi, Napolitano, Bufalini, Macaluso, Grifone, Alinovi, Perna), a center faction led first by Longo and then by Berlinguer (Tortorella, Quercioli, Giuseppe D’Alema, Lama, Dozza, Zangheri, Imbeni, Flamigni, Serri, Seroni, Tatò, Cinciari Rodano, Boldrini, Natta, Pecchioli, Alicata, Cossutta, Iotti e Pajetta, Berlinguer, Ariemma, ecc) and a left faction led by Ingrao (Reichlin, Barca, Bassolino, Rossanda, Magri, Pintor, Occhetto, Chiarante, Ledda, Luporini, Lombardo Radice).

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<sup>54</sup> Barbagallo, *ibidem*, p. 69.

<sup>55</sup> Barbagallo, *ibidem*, p. 69.

<sup>56</sup> Pupil of Togliatti, he was vice-secretary of the Italian Communist youth Federation and in 1955 joined *L’Unità*. Promoted as director in 1958, in the sixties he supported Ingrao’s positions, the most extremist in the party.

<sup>57</sup> Aldo Giannuli “*L’Ingraismo*” in *Didattica Galassia*.

<sup>58</sup> He was an anti fascist Italian politic, important leader and historian of the PCI.



Lucio Magri believed that the Ingrao's trends was not serious because, since the XII Congress (1969), he had never organized any meeting in which to arrange the positions to express with the organs of the party. On the contrary, he thought it was just a sort of spontaneous and occasional convergence in which some leaders saw Togliatti's inheritance<sup>59</sup>. It is not possible to doubt of Magri's opinion because Ingrao's ideology was more a cultural idea than a real faction (Amendola's right faction was much stronger).

Those were years in which an internal tendency of the party, especially in PCI, was not based on the loyalty towards its leader, but on a determined political culture and the Ingrao's tendency was one of the main political cultures of that period, not only in PCI but in the whole internal political system<sup>60</sup>. So, it was important to distinguish between the tendency and its leader, because other important contributions to the definition of this ideological current came from Reichlin and Barca, but in particular from Rossanda and later from Magri.

At the origin of this split, there is the debate between Amendola and Ingrao on the nature of Italian capitalism and its change, which took place in the early sixties. Amendola, who was one of the most loyal Togliatti's followers and was supported by Pietro Grifone, believed that Italian capitalism was superseded, because it was focusing on the income and it was no able to overcome the historical problems of the country (the issue of the South, the agrarian reform, a complete secularization etc.). So PCI had the task to create a coalition with the most advanced sectors of the bourgeoisie in order to realize a regime of progressive democracy able to bring to completion the bourgeois revolution and to open the way to socialism, especially by joining forces with the industrial capital (the party of the profit) to defeat the income<sup>61</sup>.

On the contrary, Ingrao affirmed that the evolutions of the monopolistic capitalism had already been absorbed the income making it functional for itself

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<sup>59</sup> L. Magri, "Il sarto di Ulm: una possibile storia del PCI", *Il Saggiatore Tascabili*.

<sup>60</sup> Aldo Giannulli, *ibidem*.

<sup>61</sup> Barbagallo, "Enrico Berlinguer", *Carocci*.

and that PCI had the task to create a social coalition able to impose a different model of development.

The political culture of Ingrao was more innovative than Amendola's one<sup>62</sup>. The Italian capitalism was enduring a transformation that made it more interconnected with the international capitalism. Amendola refused to recognize this aspect, but his loyalty to Togliatti was more literal than effective<sup>63</sup>. On the other hand, Ingrao, who tried to analyze the occurring changes with the Togliatti's method, was much closer to Togliatti's ideology than Amendola.

The new development model was, for a long time, just a slogan without any positive content, except for the new role given to the Unitarian labor union which was the real innovation in that period of social struggles. In the same way, the transmission of the political issue was still conditioned by the role of the bureaucratic apparatus of the party or of the union labor. In the Ingrao's ideology a theory of the organization was missing and it was mainly based on an idealistic imposition for which the subjectivity of the bureaucracy was removed.

Equally vague was the political proposal which should have assured the solution of the struggles for a new development model. Amendola proposed the unification of the socialist forces (also the PSDI) and a special relation with PRI, seen as the representative part of the productive bourgeoisie in order to create a sort of popular front and to conquer the majority thanks to a laic socialist formula. Ingrao was not able to indicate allies other than the PSIUP, except for an undefined Catholic left which should have joined PCI.

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<sup>62</sup> Aldo Giannulli, *ibidem*.

<sup>63</sup> Aldo Giannulli, *ibidem*.

During the elections for the President of the Republic in 1964, while Amendola supported Saragat's candidate<sup>64</sup>, Ingrao, together with PSIUP, supported Fanfani<sup>65</sup>.

In those years, Ingrao was thinking about a social transformation of the country without passing through the achievement of a parliamentary majority. He wanted that the fulcrum of the action was the formation of some balancing powers able to influence and bend the action of the government.

Often PCI accused Ingrao of political Intellectualism and abstractness. Ingrao and his followers were not able to identify a focal point and to make a valid proposal. In 1968, Ingrao's ideology split into two factions: one was more "orthodox" and the other much more radical (Rossanda, Natoli, Pintor, Magri, Castellina). The latter tried with more decision to overcome Togliatti's ideology, with modest results. In 1976 the political proposal of the PDUP for the Communism, whose secretary was Magri, corresponded to the "left government" supported by a coalition composed by PCI, the extreme left, Psi and laics. It was just the very same proposal suggested by Amendola and the socialist laic front ten years before and against which Ingrao's followers fought.

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<sup>64</sup> He was the historic leader of Socialism, and in particular of the Italian Socialist Democratic Party. In 1922 he joined Socialism not for a natural calling but for solidarity towards the poor, that is to say, the emerging working class, oppressed by rich people. Socialist of the reformist and humanitarian trend, he joined the political culture of Filippo Turati, becoming one of the most important exponents of the Unitarian Socialist Party, born in 1922 after the expulsion of Turati's reformists from PSI, when Giacomo Matteotti was secretary.

<sup>65</sup> He was three times Senate President, six times President of the Council of Minister, and the oldest President of the Italian Republic, twice secretary of the DC and also President of the party, Minister of the Foreign Affairs, of the Interior. His political action was remembered because he was considered, with Aldo Moro, Pietro Nenni, Giovanni Saragat and Ugo La Malfa, one of the architects of the left turn of the center-left, with which the DC used to create a governmental collaboration with PSI.

#### 4. *The Decision*

PCI has rarely expelled members from the party, except those who were caught stealing from the treasury; last time Central Committee expelled deputies, it was when Aldo Cucchi<sup>66</sup> and Valdo Magnani<sup>67</sup> were charged to be Tito followers. Within the party, every discussions was carried out in presence of a superior representative: the discussion was always about one single problem and after the vote, everyone used to go back to work. This system, called “democratic centralism”<sup>68/69</sup>, was a control method used by the people at the top to better understand the people at the bottom. The real discussion only happened in the management offices without arriving in the Central Committee, because the most acclaimed virtue was loyalty or rather obedience. The birth of the magazine and its success destroyed this pattern. Rossanda, Castellina and the others wanted to open the party to a new discussion about the themes which were born in the sixties, grew in 1968 with the students riot and deteriorated in the autumn of 1969<sup>70</sup>.

With Togliatti's death in August 1964, the most influential mediator between the two positions disappeared. The fight for the role of his successor was between Amendola<sup>71</sup> and Ingrao, but the management offices decided to named Longo ad interim and then opted for a third candidate, Enrico Berlinguer<sup>72</sup>. In 1966,

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<sup>66</sup> Cucchi and Magnani left the Communist Party in 1951, due to a crisis of conscience towards the party. In this situation Togliatti defined them as “lice in the mane of a noble racehorse”. In the same year Cucchi founded the Italian Workers Movement and in 1953 the Independent Socialist Union. He ended his political life in the Italian Socialist Democratic Party.

<sup>67</sup> On 1951, at the beginning of the VII Provincial Congress of PCI, he commented the agenda asserting that communists were committed to defend the national borders against any external aggressions, from whatever side it came from. He asked for a clear no to the USSR concept of guide state.

<sup>68</sup> Rossanda, R.; Castellina, L. “La nascita del gruppo del manifesto (attorno alla rivista)”, PDF, cit p 2.

<sup>69</sup> Democratic Centralism is the name given to the principles of an organization used by Leninist political parties. The democratic aspect of this method is in the freedom of the members of the party to talk about its policy and direction, but when the final decision is taken by the majority of the members, everyone has to support that decision. According to Lenin, the Democratic Centralism was “Freedom to criticize and unity of action”. (<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/may/20c.htm>)

<sup>70</sup> Rossanda, Castellina, *ibidem*, cit p 2.

<sup>71</sup> Amendola himself decided to forfeit his candidacy and proposed to support Berlinguer.

<sup>72</sup> At the beginning Berlinguer was not considered to be the right person for the position of secretary because he had not a great *cursus honorum*. He often had important positions in the hierarchy but had always stepped back, for example he lost the role of coordinator of the secretary and he became leader of the Lazio Region Committee.

during the XI Congress, the management office and Longo pushed Ingrao out because he wanted to create an alliance with Socialists, left-Catholics, politicians and union labors in order to create a new development model and to introduce the freedom to disagree in the party, but the former confused the party and the latter scared it. As a result, the party gave another assignment to Ingrao and his supporters were dismissed from their positions. Longo had to deal with the turmoils in the end of '60s: the students' riot in 1968 and the autumn of 1969 during which factories were occupied. At the same time, in 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis took place: the Soviet army occupied Prague and arrested Dubcek, establishing Husak; the PCI condemned the Soviet armed intervention as a "tragic mistake"<sup>73</sup>. PCI did not attack students and it did not try to have a clear dialogue with them, it gave to CGIL the task to transform the strong workers' movement into a soft one and, according to former Ingrao's supporters, PCI failed<sup>74</sup>. Therefore, they opened again dialogue with the Central Committee declaring that the Czechoslovakian invasion was not a tragic mistake but the logic consequence of Soviet domination on popular democracies. They also declared that the students and workers riots were developing and that PCI had not to stop them but to give them all the support they needed. Former Ingrao supporters, several commissions of Central Committee and the youth federation, asked PCI to get into the action but the party did not reply. Magri, Natoli, Pintor, Rossanda decided to challenge the leadership by not using the traditional method. Natoli, Pintor, Rossanda and Caprara made some statements in which they declared they did not agree with PCI's position on Czechoslovakia, nor with the Central Committee's Thesis.

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<sup>73</sup> Rossanda, R. " La Ragazza del Secolo Scorso", Einaudi, 2008, cit p 361.

<sup>74</sup> Rossanda, Castellina, ibidem p 7.

## 5. *The Birth*

Rossanda, Pintor and Natoli failed in their attempt to change the party. Their intention was not to create a faction: they felt that the socialism crisis was real and they believed that the center-left was in an impasse, but the society was in their favor. So, they – together with the intellectuals - gave birth to the idea of creating a monthly magazine which would not bend under the rules and that PCI could not forbid. The main creator was Lucio Magri with the initial cooperation of Rossanda, Pintor, Natoli, Castellina and Milani. Successively, others joined after the magazine was published for the first time, among them there were Valentino Parlato and Lisa Foa who had already worked for “Rinascita”<sup>75</sup>. Also Luca Trevisani from “Unità”<sup>76</sup> and Ninetta Zandegiacomi from the union labor joined the project. The publishing world did not want to help them and did not trust with them, because of the lack of appeal of magazines in Italy, and because nobody wanted to start contrasts with PCI, so they found a little publishing company in Bari<sup>77</sup>. This was the bargain: they would give to the editor a printed number of the magazine in exchange of five thousands subscriptions. They would have used the subscriptions as a guaranteed to pay a rent, a phone and the minimum requirement. At this point, the only thing that they had to do was to inform the party. Rossana talked to Berlinguer and said: “*We are organizing a monthly magazine. I am not asking for advice advice, because you would say no: I just want to inform you*”<sup>78</sup>. Berlinguer considered the matter with interest: he knew that within the party there was not an open debate about it and he knew that the little group created for the magazine already had some audience and that they would have not put the leadership of the party into jeopardy. Ingrao was not on their side, he did not want them to publish the magazine and when Rossanda told him that, according to Berlinguer, there would not be any disciplinary actions he asserted: “*They will expel you*”<sup>79</sup>. The magazine was a collective work made

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<sup>75</sup> It was a political cultural monthly magazine of the PCI established by Palmiro Togliatti in 1944. Its main aim was to open Italy to socialism, considered a great ally of communism.

<sup>76</sup> It has been from 1924 to 1991 official body of the PCI.

<sup>77</sup> Magri, “Il Sarto di Ulm”, p. 256.

<sup>78</sup> Rossanda, R. *ibidem* cit p. 372.

<sup>79</sup> Rossanda, R. *ibidem* p. 373.

by a group with common priorities and common points of view. It was hard to choose an appropriate name; at the beginning they proposed “La Ragione” or “Le armi della Critica”<sup>80</sup>, then they chose *Il Manifesto*<sup>81</sup>. In the first number all the members wrote an article. Rossanda sent the draft to Berlinguer who commented: “*And this should be a research journal? It is all about political intervention*”, and Rossanda replied: “*they are the same thing*”<sup>82</sup>. Berlinguer asked her the favor to postpone the release of a couple of weeks because he had to go to a Conference in Moscow where he wanted to attack the decision of invading Czechoslovakia and he thought that it was not good if PCUS had read the magazine before that moment. The first number of *Il Manifesto* came out in the end of June and, at the beginning, it sold thirty two thousand copies and later eighty thousands. Some days later, Rossanda and Karol met Martinet and Mitterand who wanted to know about their expulsion<sup>83</sup>, but the only thing Rossanda and Karol knew was that the Central Committee had met to discuss about the topic. During the discussion, no one supported them and only a few condemned them. Berlinguer proposed a series of compromises, such as involving other people in the publishing process, like Trentin<sup>84</sup>. Berlinguer did not want to close the magazine, but he was worried about the possibility that someone supported by PCUS, maybe Secchia or Cossutta, could take advantage from *Il Manifesto* in order to create a pro-Soviet magazine which could have caused some troubles<sup>85</sup>.

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<sup>80</sup> Marx invented “Alla critica della armi”

<sup>81</sup> They wanted a reference to Marx

<sup>82</sup> Rossanda, R. *ibidem* cit p 375.

<sup>83</sup> Martinez and Mitterand were informed by Amendola.

<sup>84</sup> He joined the Communist Party in 1950. He was vice secretary of CGIL in 1958, then general secretary of the FIOM and FLM.

<sup>85</sup> Rossanda, “La ragazza del secolo scorso”, Einaudi.

## 6. *The Radiation*

The success obtained by *Il Manifesto* changed its features because it became a political fact, both in Italy and abroad. At the beginning, the leadership of PCI tried to convince them to refuse the idea of the magazine, but then the party forbid the initiative, according to the rule excluding the legitimacy of being a faction. However, since the magazine was not a faction, it kept gathering subscriptions. Therefore, the party defined it as a group of collaborators writing on political current news making of *Il Manifesto* an effective faction. The problems for the members of *Il Manifesto* began in September 1969, the anniversary of the Czechoslovakia invasion. The problems originated from the fact that the magazine published an article entitled "*Prague is alone*"<sup>86</sup>. The Central Committee was re-gathered and formally asked for the closing of the magazine, asking each federation to take position. All of the members were aware of the radiation risk and they hesitated for a while. But then, they decided to continue for two reasons: one for method and the other for merit. The latter referred to the publishing on the party newspaper of articles judging everything that they wrote, and the former referred to the real problem: the insufficient solution of the Prague issue and their opinion about USSR. These were the points on which *Il Manifesto* wanted to open a debate to be recognized as concrete problems. So, the radiation involved Natoli, Pintor, Rossada and Magri because he was the director of the magazine. PCI decided for the radiation because the legitimation of *Il Manifesto* would have led to a contrast within the party and to the crisis of the internal equilibrium. The Central Committee voted in favor of the decision with only two votes against and five abstainers, then the federation radiated Castellina, Caprara and Bronzuto; to others were suggested to go away silently (Parlato, Barra, Zandegiacomi, Milani). After deciding for the radiation, Ingrao and others who voted in favor retracted considering it a mistake because they thought

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<sup>86</sup> The article was written by Rossanda. She criticized PCI leadership because, after the Prague Spring, it did not open a discussion on the orientation of the leadership group of USSR. Although Rossanda was aware of the evident and different historical conditions, she compared the Prague Spring to the Cultural Revolution in China "two different ways of resistance, two ways of protest, partial but extraordinary rich, against the stabilization of the global equilibrium, against political and social privileges, based on the mobilization and mass initiative" ( Rossana Rossanda, "Praga è sola", *Il Manifesto*, September 1969)



that PCI should have destroyed the little group of dissidents without administrative measures in order to better show its democratic force. Even if PCI got rid of a group of extreme left, the consequences of the radiation were not destroying its image in the eyes of the other parties and the public opinion was still reassuring. Other communist groups of the new left looked at the radiation without sympathy because they saw *Il Manifesto* as a new possible adversary. In addition, some negative consequences occurred, such as the campaign to create difficulties towards those agreeing with the ideas of *Il Manifesto*. For a long time the leadership of PCI ignored the members of *Il Manifesto*<sup>87</sup>.

### 7. *Gruppuscoli, the extreme left*

The social and political crisis spreading in Italy was a system crisis, a revolutionary crisis<sup>88</sup>. Gramsci gave the right interpretation of the period, from the position war of 1947 shifted to a movement war, “a more innovative form of struggle for the hegemony of the state power”, said Pintor, “*made by a formation of forces gradually presenting itself, with self-awareness, as the unique force able to surpass and end capitalism*”. The connection between workers and student struggles was at the basis of an alternative political front: “*we do not need a jelly and unraveled front, an undefined new majority*”<sup>89</sup>. The radicalization of the masses and young people, that is to say, of the struggles, for Natoli represented “*the modernity of revolutionary matter in western countries*” represented the construction “*of an alternative based on the hegemony of the working class, a new governmental option, a new power in a phase of transition with a program in transition*”<sup>90</sup>. Rossanda pushed “*to expand the liberating and revolutionary movements*” rather than “*the military and economic stabilization of the socialist countries*”; it was the most radical position in the core of the socialist phase about the matter of communism<sup>91</sup>. Berlinguer compared this Congress to the fifth one

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<sup>87</sup> Magri, “*Il Sarto di Ulm*”, p.257.

<sup>88</sup> F. Barbagallo, *ibidem*, p. 106.

<sup>89</sup> XII Congress p, 169-75.

<sup>90</sup> XII Congress, p 303-10.

<sup>91</sup> Barbagallo, *ibidem*, p. 106.

- which, in 1945, gave birth to the new party - and to the seventh – which, in 1956, cut ties with Stalinism. The socialism the PCI wanted, did not have neither abstract (Chinese) nor effective (Soviet) models, on the contrary, it had to be original. To proceed this way, it was important to obtain the contribution of the working class of modern capitalist countries and of PCI, which was expressing some original ideas and principles<sup>92</sup>. The socialist democracy could be realized by extending freedom till the extreme borders, in which the democracy overcomes the class limits. The aim was to transform the structure of the economy and to renew the democratic institutes by introducing new forms of direct democracy in social and political life. In this way it would have been possible to assure an effective participation of the workers in the economic and public life. The Italian peculiarity stood in the fact that the social radicalization found referring points in the parties and in the union labor, unlike in other countries. The Gramsci historical block was an alliance of social and political different forces fighting for reforming strategies and was at the base of social and political struggle.

During XII Congress of PCI in Bologna, for the first time in the history of PCI, a new line was created: a line fighting for a more organized party. The leaders of the new line were Luigi Pintor<sup>93</sup>, Rossana Rossanda<sup>94</sup>, Aldo Natoli, Lucio Magri, who created the magazine (and later newspaper) *Il Manifesto*. They affirmed that PCI should have gone back to the revolutionary political action and to its traditional role of representing workers and proletarian forces. The disagreement between the group and the policy of PCI was so clear that the split was inevitable, but it occurred because of the secretary of the party found that the existence of an organized dissident group within PCI was incompatible with the principles of the democratic centralism. The group of *Il Manifesto* was

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<sup>92</sup> F. Barbagallo, *ibidem*, p. 107.

<sup>93</sup> After the Second World War, he became Journalist for the newspaper *L'Unità* in which he was political editor and then co-director of the edition of Rome. In 1962, during the X Congress, he was elected as member of the Central Committee of the PCI, where he opposed to Amendola's idea of uniting all left forces. In 1965, he left *L'Unità* due to some conflicts with the direction.

<sup>94</sup> After the Second World War, she enrolled in the PCI and Togliatti nominated her responsible for the PCI political culture. In 1963, she was elected in the House of Representatives for the first time. In particular, Berlinguer supported her candidacy, considering her a quadro qualificator. (1968 direzione, meeting of 12th January 1968, p. 451. ).

expelled in November 1969 and became one of the most influent groups and movements forming, in the extremist left faction, the ideology known as “gruppuscoli”.

Left extremism was not a new phenomenon in the history of the Italian communist movement. An historical left represented by the Bordighisti<sup>95</sup> and by Trotskyism had always existed at the margins of PCI, even if in a critical position. Its action was marginal due to the internal polemics and divisions. At the beginning of the sixties, from an international point of view, there was an ideological contrast between Soviet and Chinese communism. As for internal situation, Italy was dealing with the contradictions of the economic miracle. This made Italy a fertile ground for the birth of new groups. These groups, starting from the cultural level and moving, then, towards the political one, tried to reinterpret Marxist and Leninist teachings according to the development of the new class conflict. The promoters were young intellectual members or former militants of PCI or PSI.

Since the sixties, the birth of the extra parliamentary groups<sup>96</sup> within the PCI was represented by a group of intellectuals, who saw in the magazine *Il Manifesto* a referring point. This group (Rossanda, Pintor, Magri, Castellina, Caprara etc..) )

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<sup>95</sup> Amadeo Bordiga was an Italian politician. He was the chief of the main current (the one of the abstentionist of PSI) that brought to the foundation of the Italian Communist Party, after the division occurred in the Livorno Congress of Psi in 1921. He fought against the Stalinist hegemony in the Third International and against the degenerations of the global revolutionary movement.

<sup>96</sup> The most famous were: Lotta Continua (militants of Potere Operaio Toscano and of the students movement of Turin created a project aiming to the increase of the antagonist awareness of the working class through a continuous and qualified mobilization. This formation published a nation newspaper that reminded the slogan in the fliers used by the workers and students in Turin “Lotta Continua”); Potere Operaio (in 1969, in Turin, convention of the workers vanguards took place and their aim was to create a national revolutionary organization. The group La Classe that aimed on the political features of the salary objective, on the working class direction of the social struggle and on the struggle against the work, created Potere Operaio with strong centers in Rome and in Veneto); Avanguardia Operaia (it was borth after the experience of Pirelli Bicocca. Its leaders had great experiences in the militia in the IV International and then in the intervention against factories); Movimento Studentesco in Milan was the strongest local group, led by Mario Capanna, Turi Toscano and Luca Cafiero. The movement did not include workers and it did not intervene in factories, instead it involved the student component); Unione dei Comunisti M-L (this was the one, among the Uci groups, to exert a major attraction on the student movement. It was the most organized, coordinated and mature among the pro-China formations. The group was born in 1968 and it imposed to its activists a rigid discipline, not only in political life but also in private one: the Union offered a salary to its activists, created sectorial reorganizations with the aim of the taking care of the young people, women, former partisans and propaganda.).

tried to create an internal ideology breaking the rules of the democratic centrism and the decision taken by the unanimity. Such heresy was incompatible with the traditional leading group of PCI, the intellectuals of *Il Manifesto* were expelled in 1970. Therefore, they created a political organization focused on the themes of the new organization<sup>97</sup>.

*Il Manifesto* had the purpose to offer an answer to the class struggles born in the western countries and in the world in the summer of 1968. The first number of the magazine was released in the summer of 1969. The editorial office was composed by a group of militants of the left of PCI among which there were three deputies. The groups of the extra-parliamentary left were diffident about this initiative coming from the PCI. In fact, the riots of the working class, during spring, confirmed the most radical hypothesis. The main danger came from within the PCI and from the predictable accusation of factionalism. Nevertheless the pressure, in June 1969, the first number of the magazine came out. After the radiation, the magazine existed until 1971, when the first newspaper of the extra-parliamentary left substituted it. In the same year, the project of aggregating with *Potere Operaio* failed. In 1972, during the election campaign, *Il Manifesto* stood with Pietro Valpreda as candidate leader, but he did not gain the quorum. In 1975, a part of PSIUP and united to Catholic MLP, giving birth to PDUP for the Communism, which, during the administrative elections, stood with *Avanguardia Operaia* in some districts and alone and some others. During the political election of the following year, the coalition of *Democrazia Proletaria* stood again with some candidates of *Lotta Continua*, but the results were unsatisfying even if the coalitions gained 5 chairs in the Parliament. Then, a part of PDUP, among which there were some founders of *Il Manifesto*, came got back in the PCI.

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<sup>97</sup> About this, it is important an essay wrote by Rossana Rossanda called "Class and Party" see; Nanni, Balestri, Primo Moroni, " *L'Orda D'Oro, 1968-1977, la grande ondata rivoluzionaria e creative, politica ed esistenziale*", p. 352-355.

## 7.1 PDUP for Communism

The group of Il Manifesto was a small political formation and a small parliamentary delegation (Natoli, Pintor, Rossanda and then Massimo Caprara and Liberato Bronzuto). In 1970, the group decided to abstain during the elections. In 1971, together with Potere Operaio, it launched the idea of the political committees. At the beginning of the seventies, it continued to propose the left unity born in 1968 (the Thesis for communism, had the same goal), but in the elections of 1972, the group of the new left showed their reluctance to the idea.

The result on that elections had a turning point: Magri, Rossanda and the great part of the group were aware that if they wanted to change the political situation, they had to create a new political force, a party, of modest dimensions<sup>98</sup>, that would have made the difference and that would not be overtaken by events. Foa's Pdup<sup>99</sup> and Spina's Mpl<sup>100/101/102</sup> were the political subjects more similar to Il Manifesto with which work for a left unity project which purpose was the reorganization and the political renewal.

Magri<sup>103</sup> declared that it was necessary to equip with a political program and to make alliances in order to face the crisis. Meantime, the dissent with the other

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<sup>98</sup> Magri had the idea to create a small party.

<sup>99</sup> It was an Italian political party of the extreme left born in 1972 due to the convergence of two parties Il Nuovo PSIUP and Alternativa Socialista. It dissolved in 1974 when it joined Il Manifesto in order to create PUDP.

<sup>100</sup> These two parties did not enter in the PCI after the failure of the quorum to enter in the chamber in 1972.

<sup>101</sup> Mpl was an Italian political party founded in 1971. After the political elections in 1972, the majority of the party joined PSI, while the minority of the party joined Alternativa Socialista that would merge with Nuovo PSIUP to found the PUDP.

<sup>102</sup> According to Il Manifesto group, the subjects were more similar to them in relations to the post 68 groups with whom they worked together to the project of left unity concerning organization, restoration and political renewal. The start of the Unitarian relationship was not easy. The dissidents were not trivial because they focused on the historical roots of the two groups, on the strategy to propose to the union labors (PDUP had its organized component in the Cgil; Antonio Lettieri, Elio Giovannini, etc.), on the economic crisis (Il Manifesto was charged of Catastrophism by Foa), on the ideal referring to communism (Pintor did not want to leave it in Breznev's hands), on the relations with PCI (at the beginning Il Manifesto was charged for an excess of collateralism, then their positions changed, indeed Magri said about Foa: "What a paradox: in 1976 with Lotta Continua, in 1989 with Achille Occhetto")

<sup>103</sup> He assumed the political control of Il Manifesto in the Autumn 1973 proposing a first strategic reconsideration to the party.

groups of the new left got worse. The problem was not to build the “party of revolution”, but to contribute to a complete renewal of the left force, including PCI. The first Unitarian meeting between *Il Manifesto* and PDUP took place in Florence in November 1973<sup>104</sup>. According to Natoli the unification ended to be as a missed opportunity. Also Magri had the same doubt: *Il Manifesto* could have settled for being a newspaper, in this way the political path could have been more efficient and with less dissents (first Natoli, then Pintor, then Rossanda and Parlato)<sup>105</sup>.

In 1975, the divergences increased also in the relationship between Magri and Foa. The former talked about the crisis in the capitalistic model and about the need to propose an alternative social and economic model; the latter underlined the process of restoration. The newspaper was the place where it was difficult to mediate this contrast. According to Pintor, the autonomy of the newspaper could not be reduced to a supporter of the party, as the pro Foa faction demanded.

During the regional elections in June 1975, the PDUP joined the institutions for the first time. But, the electoral progress of PCI was a problem. A delegation of PDUP (Magri and Pintor) met with some representatives of PCI, this was the sign that PDUP had more possibilities than *Il Manifesto* to open a dialogue with the left forces.

The Congress in Bologna in 1976, was divided in three factions: the group of the former *Il Manifesto* obtained 194 votes, the group of the former PDUP obtained 181 votes and the faction gathered around the abstention of Pintor which obtained 38 votes (among them there were Tommaso, Di Francesco and Francesca De Vito). Rossanda commented: “an abstaining Pintor is half a Pintor”. In the political elections of 1976, the former *Il Manifesto* joined *Lotta Continua* and *Avanguardia Operaia* in the coalition of proletarian democracy, which elected

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<sup>104</sup> Some political events hastened the period of the unification: the Golpe in Chile in September 1973 that justified, according to Berlinguer, the strategy of the *Compromesso Storico*; the victory of the referendum on divorce in Spring 1974; the wave of movements post 1968 was continuing (from feminism to anti psychiatry, from the one on the health to those of the zone meeting) and asking for some political answers, while the government was trapped in the penta parties led by Andreotti.

<sup>105</sup> Magri, “*Il Sarto di Ulm*”.

Magri, Milani, Castellina, Gorla, Corvisieri and Pintor obtaining 555 thousands votes, corresponding to 1,5%.

In February 1977, PDUP suffered a break because within the party there were contrasts about the role and the political line to follow in order to build to the left faction of PCI<sup>106</sup>. According to Magri, the reasons of the break stood in the scarce capability of the components of PDUP of listening to each other.

In the same year, Magri and Rossanda started a contrast. The latter did not want to open a dialogue with PCI in the case of a left government. Magri wanted to change the totality of the left, using PCI as the main interlocutor. Rossanda said *“In the unified PDUP we moved as Il Manifesto faction. We ended up contrasting each other. Now we have different positions, I do not believe in the hypothesis of refunding unique party following the path of PCI, which has privileged position in the mind of Italian workers movement”*.

In 1978, during the Congress of Viareggio of PDUP, there were different documents: one by Magri, Milani, Castellina Menapace and one by Rossanda, Campi, Parlato.

On 4th April 1978, the newspaper announced its autonomy from PDUP, and in November the final break between the newspaper and the party occurred. The majority of the delegates voted for Castellina’s relation but the newspaper did not take into account the results of the Congress.

The break between Magri and Rossanda corresponded with the break of a political cultural tandem which gave to Il Manifesto its identity.

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<sup>106</sup> Il Manifesto, 1st March 1977.

## 8. PCI Answer

The case of *Il Manifesto* accelerated the process of renovation needed by PCI.

Each organizational change corresponds to a clear political choice. In this period of social movements, the matter concerned the role PCI wanted to give to the institutions and of the political formula to adopt in this critical phase. *“First of all”,* said Ugo Pecchioli, responsible for organization *“we do not want to change radically the nature of mass struggle of PCI, nor its national and internationalist function or its unit. We want this unity to be built on a rich democratic life and on the participation of its militants. Monolithism and factionalism are the denial of democracy and unity. Il Manifesto represents an aggregation point and an organization sneaking away from the dialect of the party. It defines dissents and gathers them in a line opposed to the one collectively decided by the party during congresses. This creates damages to the development of the democracy and to the unity of the party. The right to dissent do not represent a problem, but it becomes unproductive when you search for an external referring point refusing to take part in the collegial life of the party, as the comrades of Il Manifesto did. The debate about how to enrich the party is still pen, but you do not solve it through an opposition from the outside. In reality, the comrades of Il Manifesto used the matters about the internal life in the party just to establish their political positions and ideas already rejected by the Congress.”*<sup>107</sup>

In the last few years, the political weight of PCI increased in relation to the movement and in particularly towards the traditional political forces. At the same time, a process of decline started to affect the organizational structure of the party and to threaten its long-term growth. The PCI organization was the result of the struggles of the past and not of the new political choices. The territorial section was inadequate to guarantee the party's efficient presence in big cities and to answer to the changes in the social structure of the country. But something was changing.

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<sup>107</sup> M. Signorino, “ Il Partito alla Prova”, in “L’Astrolabio”, n 45, 16 novembre 1969, p. 10.



Pecchioli observed *“Can you believe that the growth of the political weight of PCI was achieved without any real contribution by its millions of its militants? Who believes this, believes in miracles. Of course, great social and political changes underline new problems and determine need of adaption of our organization. The current period of popular and workers struggle requires the total commitment of the party. But this analysis has nothing to do with the affirmation that everything is to be remade”*<sup>108</sup>. A study made by the federation of Bologna on the composition of members of the party gave a worrying view of the situation, but it also showed a new tendency. Some data: the total enrollment was 105.000, which 35.7 was made by workers, 37 by housewives and pensioners, 0.7 by students and intellectuals; until 30 years old 13.4%, 30/40 years old 19.9%, 40/50 years old 25.7%, beyond 50 years old 36.6%. Here are the data after the enrollment of 5.000 members in 1969: 52.9% was workers, 5% students and intellectuals, 71.6% young until 30 years old. The organizational recovery of PCI it is seen also in the factories. Pecchioli claimed *“Those who affirm that there is a reduction of the influence of the communist organization in factories ignores the real situation. We still have some lacks to worry us. But why should you use them to say that the general line of the party is inadequate? The restart of workers struggles cannot be explain without underlining the decisive role of the party in its Unitarian policy and its organization. We still have to walk a long path, but the first steps are significant and encouraging signs of a tendency towards a reinforcement of the communist organization in the workplace. In the Olivetti factory in Ivrea, our faction had 163 members in 1966 and today they are 306; in Fiat-Nord we counted 31 members three years ago, now they 144; Pirelli had only 97 communists, today they are 298”*<sup>109</sup>. Some doubted that PCI could be an adequate political tool for the new period of struggles and that its choices could be in contrast with an apparatus following a different political logic. Pecchioli answered: *“A mass and a struggle party, a worker party, cannot live without an apparatus made by militants who dedicate all their time to the organization. A party such as ours, opposed to the leading forces, does not promote careerists.*

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<sup>108</sup> M. Signorino, *ibidem* pp 10/11.

<sup>109</sup> M. Signoretti. *Ibidem* p 11.

*Workers, intellectuals and young people, make the great majority on our apparatus, but the apparatus is not a leading organism. The direction of the party is assured by the organs elected during the congresses, even if those organs not always work as they are supposed to do. I believe that there are no other parties or social organization having a huge prevalence of volunteering leaders.*"<sup>110</sup>

The PCI reality seemed to be more rational and optimistic than how it really was, for examples, in the past, PCI had a closing attitude towards the student movement. In addition, it did not trust the new radical policies born with the workers struggles and also it made some inquisitor speeches in the the Central Committee about II Manifesto. PCI wondered if it was possible to undergo an internal renewal without breaking. The point concerned both the organizational and the political side. Pecchioli asserted: "*one of the main problems about the growth of PCI is its construction and its development in the workplace. For this, it is necessary to continue a battle on the role of the party in the factories, in order to create an evident connection between the demanding struggle, the reform struggle, the political renovation of the Country, the link between Unitarian workers democracy and representative institutes, between processes of union labor unity and the constitution of a workers unity*"<sup>111</sup> . The commitment was big and it concerned a big change of structures, procedures and ritualism. More than one time, PCI noticed they had to work harder and during the last Central Committee, Berlinguer underlined the chances to make a step forward in respect of the line decided in the XII congress. In this, it is possible to outline a few elements, which would probably establish the platform on which PCI would act in the next years. Pecchioli said: "*We want to make politics with the half million members we have*"<sup>112</sup>. That it was the main concern among the communist leaders. Some rumors revealed that the communists denied a strategy that could have brought the party to be blend with the movement and to be limited to organize a little avant-garde of the working class. This idea was rejected because it would mean a complete overturning of the lines chosen by PCI within Italian

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<sup>110</sup> M. Signoretti, *ibidem* p 11.

<sup>111</sup> M. Signorino, *ibidem* p 11.

<sup>112</sup> M. Signorino, *ibidem* p 12.

society and in the international communism. It would have meant to break the system of the social alliances, to deny of the institutional asset, to empty the meaning of the electoral mechanism, to believe that the constitutional chart was superseded and not useful to fight. What PCI wanted to be a party still tied to the movement but not consumed by it.

That time was the most delicate phase of the workers struggles. The first problem was how to merge the big movement with the narrow negotiation for the contracts, without impoverish the importance of workers' requests. The issue concerned the political involving in the fight: the proposals made advanced by the left forces were not sufficient. The risk was to create a funnel: strong fighting movements on one side and insufficient and underdeveloped answers on the other. Pecchioli was optimistic "*Workers struggles are going through a delicate moment, but the movement expresses an Unitarian will, combativeness, a tactic and strategic capacity which seem reassuring. The task of the movement is to win the contract fight. To do this, it is necessary that all the left political forces, in the respect of the union labor autonomy, support these fights with mass initiatives in order to achieve the reform goals, the democratic development and the political renovation that had been proposed by the entire movement. The fights in progress had to win in order to bring to an higher level the fight for the national politic renovation*".<sup>113</sup> In the practice, the speech was totally different because the logic of reforms was still vague and the working conquers weakened when they entered in the general political framework. The left critics of the communist politic stated that in this case, the left showed its weakness and they wondered if this meant that the reforming program and the democratic progressive line were a mistake. At this point, the divergence with the leading line in the PCI was immense.

Pacchioli assumed: "*A lots of false prophets foresaw the explosion of an Italian May this year, a fight to the death in which you win or you lose everything, but they were wrong*"<sup>114</sup>. The workers struggles kept the political equilibrium inside

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<sup>113</sup> M. Signorino, ibidem p 12.

<sup>114</sup> M. Signorino, ibidem p 12.

and outside the factories, they put in crisis the international politics that emptied the representative institutes, they attacked the power basis in the factories. Maybe they could be considered incompatible with the capitalistic system and they may create a new society. *“Workers’ claims - said Pecchioli - stay in a perspective of development and of advanced democracy, they move inside a strategy of a democratic and socialist renovation. But this it does not mean that the victory of the workers would bring to an overturning of the capitalistic system. However, their victory would bring new themes and new forces to start other fights able to change and transform Italian society towards a democratic and socialist nature. The extremist aggravations had the function to spoil the solidarity of the movement in order to isolate it and make it weaker at the eyes of the enemies. The movement showed great maturity and was aware that the extremism has to be isolated”. “It is important to polemicize against initiatives that are beneficiating master. Nevertheless, we know that the best way not to give space to the extremism is the strengthening of the union labor unity, the presence of the initiative and the organization of the party, the overcoming of our weakness. The matrix of brutality is always the right force, the social injustice, the police, the provocations of the owners and the crime of fascism. We know that diversions, a fight with the police, the stone through a window are not the right way to win the enemy.”*<sup>115</sup> It seems that communists have already cut those ties started in 1968 with students, workers, and extremists, but it is not possible to say that they have developed the whole problematic brought to life by those struggles.

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<sup>115</sup> M. Signorino, *ibidem* p 34.

## Chapter III

### *The American Veto*

#### 1. *The First Impression*

*“Sorprendente anche la vittoria in campo del democratico di Carter ( 54 per cento) su Wallace ( 35 per cento)”*<sup>1</sup>. Seen the tone of the article, no one expected such success for Jimmy Carter in the American primary elections organized to choose the democratic candidate. *“Le ragioni di un inatteso successo”* why did not anybody expect such success by Carter? The reasons of the success of this non-relevant figure may be due to the fact that he was totally and ideally different from his predecessors, and, for this, it could be the one able to change the American political situation after the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal. Since then, the American foreign policy was marked by negative events (above mentioned). The outcomes of these events and the large appeal they had on the global public dissatisfied the majority of American population, who started believing that a candidate such as Jimmy Carter - not being a man of Washington establishment - could change the situation thanks to his different point of view. People thought that he could give a breath of fresh air in political decisions. *“Chi è Carter? Cosa rappresenta nel panorama politico Americano? I commentatori politici tendono a portare in rilievo la sua religiosità, che lo stesso Carter peraltro sbandiera. Ecco cosa scriveva ieri di lui il corrispondente della France Press: “Sfoggiando il suo più largo sorriso, che rappresenta ormai il suo marchio di fabbrica per decine di milioni di telespettatori americani, l'ex governatore della Georgia ( è stato) catapultato da qualche settimana in una relativa oscurità al proscenio della vita politica”*<sup>2</sup>. The display of his religiosity should have suggested the method of conduct of his policy and, in particular, his commitment for a different theme never touched by American policy. The fact that he was always smiling, could have created such an empathy with the electorate, in particular

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<sup>1</sup> “ Primarie USA. Ford battuto da Reagan”, Il Manifesto, 25 Marzo 1976, Stampa.

<sup>2</sup> “ Primarie USA in Pennsylvania, Carter può essere battuto solo da Humphrey. Le ragioni di un inatteso successo”, Il Manifesto, 29 Aprile 1976, Stampa.

after those events that jeopardized the political and social climate, not only of the nation but also of the world. In addition, his career was different from the one of the other candidates for presidency: he has never been a deputy “*Un outsider fino in fondo che agli occhi dell’elettorato Americano rappresenta la rivincita del localismo, dalla piccola America laboriosa e agreste contro una Washington accentratrice e corrotta*”<sup>3</sup>. This image, so different from the one of any other candidate that the White House had ever had, was particularly important for Carter in the period of the presidential campaign because, in that climate, the most important thing was the candidate and not the party. Indeed, Jimmy Carter had a great chances to obtain important results thanks to his public image “*la sconfitta del senatore, tipico esponente della fauna parlamentare democratica, è da questo punto di vista eloquente. Tanto più che Carter ha vinto in sessantasei su sessantasette contee dello stato, trovandosi primo in seno a tutti i gruppi sociali ed etnici e, per la prima volta in tutte le classi di età*”<sup>4</sup>.

“*Il candidato democratico ha invece sostenuto che sarebbe sbagliato chiudere la porta per quanto riguarda l’amicizia con noi, ai dirigenti comunisti in Italia*”<sup>5</sup>. Italy had always been an American ally, to such an extent that it was considered as the fifty-first state of the United States. Carter, who according to the journalist “*sarà il candidato del neo-isolazionismo Americano e del taglio ai faraonici bilanci federali? Sembra molto probabile*”<sup>6</sup>, surprised when he dealt with the communist issue in Italy, because he never pronounced his intentions about the conduct of foreign policy. In those years, the Italian Communist Party obtained great results like never before in the administrative and political elections and Carter’s declaration made Italian Communists think that, in the case of victory, he would have approved an Italian Communist government. It is probable that Carter’s declaration gave birth to the idea that he was pro-communist or that, at least, he

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<sup>3</sup> “*Primarie USA. Dopo l’ultima vittoria in Pennsylvania, Carter può essere battuto solo da Humphrey. Le ragioni di un inatteso successo*”, Il Manifesto, 29 Aprile 1976, Stampa.

<sup>4</sup> “*Primarie USA. Dopo l’ultima vittoria in Pennsylvania, Carter può essere battuto solo da Humphrey. Le ragioni di un inatteso successo*”, Il Manifesto, 29 Aprile 1976, Stampa.

<sup>5</sup> “*USA. Comunisti al governo in Italia: Ford contrario, Carter possibilista*”, Il Manifesto, 4 Maggio 1976, Stampa.

<sup>6</sup> “*Primarie USA. Dopo l’ultima vittoria in Pennsylvania, Carter può essere battuto solo da Humphrey. Le ragioni di un inatteso successo*”, Il Manifesto, 29 Aprile 1976, Stampa.

was much more open to the idea of having a communist ally than his predecessors.

*“ Andreotti torna a Washington vincitore. Porta a Carter l'accordo col PCI e una fedeltà storica. Si conferma il prediletto degli USA”*<sup>7</sup>. Andreotti, after being elected due to the PCI abstention, went to Carter in order to refer about the Italian issues and to reassure that the new social and political situation in Italy would not change the agreements with communists. Actually, communists showed a peculiar inclination in such a delicate internal policy: they backed down in a moment in which they could have obtained different results. They showed the desire to cooperate and not to contrast. *“Andreotti si è addirittura complimentato per la nuova prassi adottata dall'amministrazione Carter verso il PCI... il segnale più eloquente dell'atmosfera in cui Andreotti sarebbe stato ricevuto a Washington era venuto con la notizia, ancora freschissima, del veto finalmente concesso dal Dipartimento di Stato al corrispondente dell'Unità Alberto Jacoviello”*<sup>8</sup> . Alberto Jacoviello was not only a journalist of L'Unità (the main communist newspaper) but also he was a representative of PCI. Jacoviello arrived in Washington with a not common availability of money according to the severe habits of the communist newspaper. He was located in Georgetown (one of the most famous and chic districts of the city) and he became one of the major figures of the area: the first Eurocommunist in flesh and bones on the American soil. His purpose was not only to be a journalist but also to enlarge public relations and, gradually, he was able to conquer the trust of the American people and, in this way, he promoted the signal of the détente between PCI and America. He wanted to give a different vision of the Italian communism and of the Eurocommunism from the one that was embodied in the American society, in order to have much more possibilities and support in the case communists would have had a place in the Italian government. He was also invited at the White House and had a dance with Rosalyn Carter (the wife of the President).

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<sup>7</sup> Il Manifesto, 26 Luglio 1977, Stampa.

<sup>8</sup> ITALIA-USA, Rapporti Est-Ovest e Usa-Europa, crisi economica e eurocomunismo, i temi degli incontri di Andreotti”, Il Manifesto, 26 Luglio 1977, Stampa.

The image of Carter before 1978 corresponded to a political man who could be the precursor of specific ideas, such as a certain degree of openness towards the Eurocommunist parties, but maybe Americans were not ready for such political turning point yet.

## 2. *The Italian reaction*

The analysis of the articles published by *Il Manifesto* concerns European allies' vision of the American President Jimmy Carter and the Italian and the European reactions after the declaration made by the President, who, on 12<sup>th</sup> January 1978, explicitly put the veto on the PCI's possibility to take part in the government. Until that moment, Carter had never considered the communism as a problem for his policy. On the contrary, as shown by the statements made in 1976/1977 and mentioned above, he had actually always showed a degree of openness towards the left forces. The situation changed in the moment in which in Italy there was the effective possibility of having a left force in the government, the PCI.

*“ Il centro-sinistra è sempre stato il massimo delle aspirazioni per i politologi americani, ma non ci può essere ormai centro-sinistra che si ferma ai socialisti, deve coinvolgere anche il PCI, se non nel governo almeno nella maggioranza. Questo sarà difficile da capire negli Stati Uniti, ma questa è la realtà politica italiana”*<sup>9</sup>. The United States has always had only two parties (Republican and Democratic) to vote for during political elections. On the contrary, in Italy the list of parties has always been wide, therefore, since it was difficult for a single party to achieve 50% of votes in an election, to rule it was necessary to create some coalitions, in which also communists could be included.

*“ La posizione Americana, ha tenuto a precisare un portavoce del presidente, non è mutata rispetto a quella enunciata da Carter già l'estate scorsa e*

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<sup>9</sup> M. Paissan. “ USA-ITALIA. Sul veto Usa al PCI, per Pajetta è la Dc che deve parlar chiaro. Granelli, responsabile dell'ufficio esteri DC, dice che in Francia Carter ha esagerato, ma polemizza con i viaggi a Mosca”, *Il Manifesto*, 10 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.



*riassumibile nella formula non indifferenza e non ingeranza*<sup>10</sup>. Carter's policy could be explained in this way: it excluded any possible American interference in the Italian national politics but it affirmed the American preferences of having friends and allies ruled by political parties with strong democratic traditions, values and habits. The persistent American opposition to the communists' approach to the government was expressed with an unambiguous language. The beginning of Carter's Administration was scattered by several and complicated attempts concerning the communists' issue, but the result of this political and cultural activism was different. In this case, it is important to notice the difference in policy managing made by Vance and Brzezinski, respectively the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, who had different views on the matter. The policy followed by Carter in the first two years of his mandate was suggested by Vance's point of view. Successively, Brzezinski's political conduct towards communism drove to the turning point of 1978, which confirmed the usual American position (totally anti-communist), camouflaged by less direct forms. The expression "*Non indifferenza non ingeranza*" may seem to give to any country the opportunity to decide, but, actually, it was not like this. The United States felt legitimate to watch over any ally and to give some advises that were not just advises, but they resulted as an explicit suggestion. The United States had always given a sort of diktats to their political allies in order to respect some rules and felt legitimate to do so due to the economic, political and military aids given to the allies in the post war period. In the Italian case, Carter did not want to enter in the Italian political affairs, but at the same time, being Italy an ally, he felt legitimate to take some decisions for it. Carter was ambiguous: just like in other decisions concerning foreign policy, indeed, since he did not have the right knowledge and experience, he followed his advisors' lead (it seemed that Brzezinski could be the author of this decision).

*“ Il suo recente soggiorno a Parigi, aveva indotto molti osservatori a pensare che l'amministrazione USA avesse alla fine optato per la non indifferenza e*

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<sup>10</sup> A. Dakil. " GLI USA E LA CRISI DI GOVERNO IN ITALIA. Su Carter l'ombra di Kissinger", Il Manifesto, 12 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

*basta*"<sup>11</sup>. This decision surprised, because it showed how the President could not take any decisions about a topic considered so important by the American public opinion. He was also forced by the American Congress, after seeing that his foreign policy brought only failures and a reduction of the American prestige, not only in the eyes of the Americans themselves but also in the eyes of the world. The President let his staff advising him entirely because his policy only concerned the respect of the human rights. But this attitude drove him to some lacks on political issues, furthermore, the fact that he was not a professional politician (he presented himself as the new face of American policy to redeem the United States from the scandals of his predecessors) made him a little bit inexpert on such controversial, international and difficult situations. In the end, even if Carter's vision towards communism was softer, in the American society endured a strong anti-communist ideal. The United States were not yet ready for such a political turning point and the proof stayed in the fact that the Ambassador Gardner<sup>12</sup> was summoned in Washington to discuss the Italian situation.

*"La crisi di governo a Roma prendesse la piega di un'apertura al PCI. Carter afferma oggi che in quel caso non potrebbe porre veti, e che in fin dei conti i problemi più complicati verrebbero dalla NATO e li andrebbero risolti"*<sup>13</sup>. Using the "*non ingerenza*" expression, Carter moved the axis: if the Communists are in the government, it was a NATO problem. Berlinguer (secretary of the Italian Communist Party) had expressed in favor of the NATO. PCI tried to reassure the western allies and in particular America. It formally voted in support of Italy's foreign and defense policies in December 1977. In addition, it claimed that Italy should have remained a member of NATO in order not to spoil the power balance and not to endanger the *détente* and even in order to prevent Russian interference while democratic socialism was built. Moreover, the PCI was firmly

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<sup>11</sup> A, Dakli. "GLI USA E LA CRISI DI GOVERNO IN ITALIA. Su Carter l'ombra di Kissinger", Il Manifesto, 12 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

<sup>12</sup> The initiative of the declaration would be taken not by the top level of the Carter administration, - namely the same president, Vance or Brzezinski, - but by the Italian desk of the State Department and by some lobbies of the congress (in particular by the Italo-American one), on the insistence of the Ambassador Gardner (due to the panic of being the one who, in his career, would have brought the communists to the power).

<sup>13</sup> A, Dakli. "GLI USA E LA CRISI DI GOVERNO IN ITALIA. Su Carter l'ombra di Kissinger", Il Manifesto, 12 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

committed to the Economic European Community and to western integration (supporting the EEC made the Italian Communist Party more respectable and legitimate at the European level).

*“ La chiarezza deve valere per tutti. Chi siano gli elettori, gli eletti, i partiti, e i dirigenti di partito che decidono del governo italiano deve essere detto con chiarezza: essi sono gli italiani. Se la non indifferenza fosse soltanto un eufemismo per mascherare l’ingerenza, gli italiani devono sapere rispondere di no”*<sup>14</sup>. The Italian Communist Party proposed some intelligent and particular solutions, not only for the Italian situation (the *Compromesso Storico*, the abstention to let Andreotti form a government, the so called *Governo della non Sfiducia*), but also for giving a different image of itself to the United States. Indeed, the party and its main newspaper sent some representatives in the US in order to make Italian communism better known in America. Pajetta, the PCI representative who pronounced the sentence above, wanted to underline the fact that only Italians could decide and take decisions over their internal political situations, in total autonomy. But why then a representative of the PCI (Cervetta) went to Moscow? Maybe to refer the situation and to ask how to behave? The PCI called for the Italian independence, but it appeared not be independent at all.

With the declaration, Carter rejected all his initial ideas, also forced by the American situation. *“ Dunque non vi possono essere equivoci o distorsioni, quella fornita ieri dall’ambasciatore Gardner è la traduzione ufficiale del testo dell’amministrazione statunitense, è la “voce” di Carter”*<sup>15</sup>. The journalist was a little bit ironic when he wrote the “voice” of Carter. It underlined, as mentioned before, that it was not Carter in person to take such decision, but his political entourage. *“Una voce che ha riproposto, rispetto a alter dichiarazioni del presidente nordamericano, un tono di durezza nei confronti dei partiti comunisti*

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<sup>14</sup> M, Paissan. “ USA-ITALIA. Sul veto Usa al Pci, per Pajetta è la DC che deve parlar chiaro. Granelli, responsabile dell’ufficio esteri DC, dice che in Francia Carter ha esagerato, ma polemizza con i viaggi dei comunisti a Mosca”, *Il Manifesto*, 10 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

<sup>15</sup> “ CRISI. Da Washington giunge la voce della Casa bianca. L’ingerenza è clamorosa peggio che al tempo della guerra fredda”, *Il Manifesto*, 12 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

*dell'Europa occidentale, e in particolare del PCI*<sup>16</sup>. Seen his previous declaration, this tone did not belong to the President, this was another proof that this declaration was not made by Carter himself (some of his speech was written without the help of anybody else but his fist) but by his staff. *“La forma è tutto. Per la prima volta in assoluto, dal 1945, il Dipartimento di Stato interviene in modo formale, attraverso una dichiarazione ufficiale del suo portavoce ritrasmessa dall'ambasciata a Roma, in una crisi virtualmente aperta del governo italiano”*<sup>17</sup>. The formality of the document was due to the intent to let the Italian and the other European governments understand that, from that moment, that would have been the American policy towards the communism without any change of course.

*“ Gli Stati Uniti e l'Italia hanno in comune profondi valori e interessi democratici e noi non riteniamo che i comunisti condividano tali valori e interessi”*<sup>18</sup>. The aversion of the United States towards the PCI resided in the fact that the PCI was not considered a democratic force. The US had the idea that in every country where there was a communist leading force, the liberties and the civil rights were not respected, even if in Italy the communist party was totally different from the Soviet one, which was the one in the American mind.

*“ Siamo al di là dell'ingerenza, che c'è sempre stata, e che del resto il PCI aveva smesso di contrastare, visto che aveva anzi sollecitato, a più riprese, il consenso americano alla sua politica eurocomunista”*<sup>19</sup>. Seen the guarantees that the Eurocommunist party had given (NATO, EEC, the independence from Moscow, liberties and the civil rights), PCI would have expected a different answer and not a total denial. The American interference had always been present or at least perceived in the Italian issues, because the importance of Italy inhabited in its geopolitical importance and in the American military installations in the country. Italy was important for what it represented: the loss of Italy would have damaged the United States' credibility and at the same time would have

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<sup>16</sup> “ CRISI. Da Washington giunge la voce della Casa bianca. L'ingerenza è clamorosa peggio che al tempo della guerra fredda”, Il Manifesto, 12 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

<sup>17</sup> M.N. “ La porta in faccia”, Il Manifesto, 12 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

<sup>18</sup> “ CRISI. Da Washington giunge la voce della Casa Bianca. L'ingerenza è clamorosa peggio che al tempo della guerra fredda”, Il Manifesto, 12 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

<sup>19</sup> M.N. “ La porta in faccia”, Il Manifesto, 12 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

fostered the enemies. This was thinkable due to the Italian political situation: Italian people had already expressed their preferences during the elections, and now the government should have answered to it. This was a reason of anxiety for the United States because it could create a domino effect in southern and Western Europe. Furthermore, another problem that concerned Washington was which role Italians could have played with communists in the governments in the Mediterranean Sea and with the Arabic world. With the declaration, America reiterated its intentions of maintaining the two spheres of influences, and by its side, the full control of the Western block, but with the PCI in the government, the axis could have changed. The document was an act to destabilize European countries that believed in Eurocommunism. Maybe the United States saw in this union a possible future force that could become a third pole able to destabilize the world order as it had been so far.

*“ In Italia i partiti (PCI compreso) fanno finta di non aver sentito bene il veto di Carter”<sup>20</sup>. This first page title showed that in Italy all the political forces, PCI included, were not affected by the statement of the American President due to the problems of internal policy, because the internal policy had the priority over the international one. “Il presidente del consiglio (Andreotti) ha detto: vi ringrazio e vi saluto, sicuro di rivedervi presto, quando sarò di nuovo alla guida di un monocolore sostenuto da una maggioranza di programma della quale, nonostante non piaccia a tutti, non si può proprio fare a meno”<sup>21</sup>. Each country had to find the solutions according to its situation, in that period, Andreotti did not have any other alternative and without the support or the abstention of PCI, he could not have given a government to Italy. The last part of the declarations expressed by Andreotti was a clear shot to the American not-interference. In that period, Italian political situation was unstable due to the fragility of political alliances. The governments had short terms and followed one another due to the little intent cohesion and to the realization of their own political program. Indeed,*

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<sup>20</sup> “ In Italia i partiti ( PCI compreso) fanno finta di non aver sentito bene il veto di Carter”, Il Manifesto, 14 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

<sup>21</sup> P.P. “GOVERNO. Andreotti riceve oggi i capogruppo dei sei per farsi dire che se ne deve andare. Poi, lunedì, andrà al Quirinale per dimettersi e farsi poi dire che deve tornare”, Il Manifesto, 14 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

during the meeting of the DC group, which took place on January 13<sup>th</sup>, 1978, almost every deputy was present (it was a great event considering that the abstention was usually very high). During the meeting there was the common will to solve the political and governmental emergency and the proposed alternative was “*meglio il PCI al governo che nella maggioranza*”<sup>22</sup>, as punishment for the non-governability of the country. It was better to have the PCI in the government because it would not be alone, it could not have the decisional power alone, and the other parties could have controlled it, while in the majority it would have had much more liberty.

The same day of the declaration, Il Manifesto also analyzed the figure of the former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. According to the journalist and to the public opinion, Kissinger might have been the advocate of the change of position made by Carter, furthermore Kissinger made a careful analysis of the Italian communism which, according to him, presented itself in a different way from what it really was. “*Oltre a tutto, ha insistito, i comunisti non hanno diritto di pretendere una fetta di potere, perchè la loro grande influenza nella vita politica dei paesi europei occidentali non corrisponde alla realtà dei desideri dei cittadini ed è invece determinata da altri fattori, in primo luogo dalla loro organizzazione e disciplina e poi, specialmente per quanto riguarda l'Italia, dall'opposizione sociale tra nord e sud e dal mito della resistenza, che serve al PCI per presentarsi come l'unico ad aver combattuto il fascismo*”<sup>23</sup>. For long time the belief was that the Resistance had been a quality of the communist party. Actually, the movement of the Resistance was characterized by the Unitarian commitment of multiples and sometimes opposite political orientations (communists, azionists, monarchics, socialists, democristians, liberals, republicans, anarchics). Kissinger made another strong statement in order to discredit the PCI to the American eyes “*in Italia, anche il terrorismo lavora per i comunisti ed è da loro in*

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<sup>22</sup> M. Paissan. “ CRISI. Il governo si dimette lunedì. I deputati Dc discutono del dopo-Andreotti. Si sentono forti, ma anche al buoi. Le elezioni anticipate fanno gola, ma soprattutto paura”, Il Manifesto, 13 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

<sup>23</sup> “ STATI UNITI. La non ingerenza negli affari europei non poteva reggere alla prova dei fatti. Kissinger precede Carter nel veto al PCI: secondo lui i comunisti sono forti per il mito della resistenza e finanziano i terroristi”, Il Manifesto, 13 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

*qualche modo foraggiato*<sup>24</sup>, Kissinger referred to the Red Brigades, one of the main protagonists in the Years of Lead in Italy. It was true that the BR was an Italian terroristic organization of extreme left, which aim was to develop the revolutionary armed riot for the communism, but even now there are not absolute proofs in support of this theory. Moreover, the two parts in question, PCI and American, accused each other for the same crime, giving to the BR some loans to operate. Surely, they accused each other in order not to find the truth.

The United States found another ally in this fight against Italian communism: the Vatican. *“I vescovi intimano alla DC di non collaborare col PCI”*<sup>25</sup>. The Vatican supported the United States’ decision, on one side because the US during the post war period helped the Church with economic aids, and also because the Vatican saw the communism as the mortal enemy of Christianity, being an atheistic power. However, the bond that connected the Communists to the Church was much deeper. The top of the universal Catholic Church had always been Italian – all the Popes until 1978 had always been Italian. Even if, in general, Italian Catholicism always assumed an anti-communism attitude, in the final years of the Fascist regime, during the war and the anti-nazi and anti-fascist resistance, it was spread in Italy a narrow and elitist movement of communist Catholics. There were two phases, on the chronological plan, in the Vatican’s attitude (by the pope and the Holy See) towards the communist regime: Pio XI and Pio XII realized a real spiritual anti-communist crusade. Then Giovanni XXIII, Paolo VI and the Second Vatican Council had a different prospective, inclined to the dialogue which gave strength to the Catholic in some communist countries (like Poland), in which it was possible to nominate some bishops. The Italian catholic thinking, in particular after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), had a communicative method towards each part, - towards the adversaries and towards communists (distinguishing the ideology, to condemn, with the real person to host with humanity and dialogue) -. On the other side, there was a

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<sup>24</sup> “ STATI UNITI. La non ingerenza negli affari europei non poteva reggere alla prova dei fatti. Kissinger precede Carter nel veto al PCI: secondo lui i comunisti sono forti per il mito della resistenza e finanziano i terroristi”, Il Manifesto, 13 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

<sup>25</sup> “ I vescovi intimano alla DC di non collaborare col PCI”, Il Manifesto, 28 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

social doctrine much more advanced on the solidarity plan, of the justice and the charity. At the same time the PCI, in the opposition, developed a progressive democratic attitude (even if with some ambiguities) such as the Italian way to socialism. For this reason, many Italian democrat-Catholics (gathered in the DC party) began to look at the PCI with some attention and to encourage the fulfilled evolution of the democratic way and the autonomy from Moscow. The major point of the dialogue happened with the Catholic Aldo Moro and the communist Enrico Berlinguer in order to save the Italian democracy in the seventies from the danger of terrorism and from the economic crisis. The murder of Moro by the Red Brigades in 1978 interrupted that experiment, but shortly thereafter the major part of the Italian communist left the communist ideology, to reach a completely democratic policy of left (PDS) and, in the end, to join with the heirs of Italian democratic Catholicism creating the actual Democratic party.

### 3. *The European reaction*

Since here it had been analyzed and commented the articles that concerned the Italian reaction to Carter's declaration, now *Il Manifesto* focused its attention on the repercussion that this declaration has had in the other European countries.

*"Reazioni più dure in Francia che in Italia all'ingerenza Usa."*<sup>26</sup> The great brutality of the French reactions were due to the different relationship and attitude of the two European countries towards the United States. France (following its political strategic and cultural inheritance of the General De Gaulle) has always considered itself as an antagonist of the American superpower within the European territory: it had always had an attitude of challenge towards the US. Furthermore, it was clear that the PCF wanted to appear as a national party and a patriotic one, the only one among the French parties to interpret at its best the French pride better than the others. In Italy, the major worry of the PCI was the contrary: Berlinguer did not want to appear anti American but at the same time

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<sup>26</sup> " GOVERNO. Reazioni più dure in Francia che in Italia all'ingerenza Usa. Le Monde paragona Carter a Breznev. I partiti italiani minimizzano", *Il Manifesto*, 14 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.



he did not want to put in contradictions his own political creed with the western belonging. In fact, some years before Berlinguer declared that Italy had not to exit from the Atlantic Pact because the fact of being part in the NATO was for him a guarantee (this was a declaration that a French communist leader could never think). The American did not take into account that France expressed its identity during the French Revolution and that with its motto Libertè, Egalità, Fraternità, could never have a communism such as the Soviet one. The French Communist Party would have guaranteed all the rights and duties to all the citizens.

*“ L’Unità è assai meno enfatica e, in sostanza tende a minimizzare. Nelle poche dichiarazioni rese da esponenti comunisti si nota lo sforzo per ridurre il senso della clamorosa ingerenza americana”<sup>27</sup>. Italy, and in particular the communist press, minimized the political vicissitudes ( aforementioned ) also because the strong tones used by France did not belong to it, but at the same time it made the American see its reasons “nessuno ha ancora deciso di interrompere il rapporto con il PCI, da cui tutti sembra si aspettino una rassegnata accettazione delle condizioni sempre più pesanti che i suoi partner in un’eventuale maggioranza di governo si apprestino a porgli, forti più ancora che del sostegno americano dell’irrisolutezza della politica comunista, della sua incapacità a sottrarsi al vicolo cieco in cui si è cacciata”<sup>28</sup>. Why? It seemed that PCI lost its own identity. On one side, it had a clear denial by the Americans and on the other side, the Italian political parties wanted to use it when needed to make it do what they wanted. PCI found itself in an uncomfortable situation, it could not decide and it had to submit to the decisions of others. Differently from the Italian communists, French reactions were much more severe thanks, maybe, to the major force that they had in their country, considering the concrete possibility that the French Communist Party had to join the government.*

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<sup>27</sup> “ GOVERNO. Reazioni più dure in Francia che in Italia all’ingerenza Usa. Le Monde paragona Carter a Breznev. I partiti italiani minimizzano”, Il Manifesto, 14 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

<sup>28</sup> “ GOVERNO. Reazioni più dure in Francia che in Italia all’ingerenza Usa. Le Monde paragona Carter a Breznev. I partiti italiani minimizzano”, Il Manifesto, 14 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

“ *Se la Francia non in piena crisi di governo come l'Italia, scriveva ieri Le Monde, è però in campagna elettorale*”<sup>29</sup>. Maybe the American declaration has been a gift for the French Communist Party, in particular in that period of electoral campaign. The severe reactions were a proof. The French Communist Party used the reactions and the consequent attack towards the United States as a force point to gain the prestige in the eyes of the electorate. In this way, French people may have seen in the PCF as a winner force, able rule them. If the PCF had the force to face a superpower such as the United States, it could also be able to rule the French population (that always had the feeling of supremacy and the attitude of a great nation that had to find again its position in the world order). The PCI minimized and it closed in itself, while the PCF reunited (this was the major difference between the two parties). PCF reaffirmed the sovereignty of the people and let know that an interference in the country was not accepted by anyone, neither by an ally. PCF knew what it wanted and how to achieve it, it saw the extreme reaction against the Americans as an opportunity to use in the electoral campaign and gain much more votes of those it could have obtained. “*La grave ingerenza del Dipartimento di Stato Americano è oggetto dei commenti di quasi tutte le prime pagine dei giornali di ieri. Per Liberation Carter ha votato sulle vicende italiane. Il Matin, vicino ai grandi partiti della sinistra, parla di collera dei PC europei. Il troskista Rouge definisce Carter un aniteuropeista primario. Al rapporto fra la presa di posizione del governo statunitense e la crisi di governo italiana vengono dedicati numerosissimi articoli*”<sup>30</sup>. Differently from the Italian press, the French newspapers did not minimize the situation and instead they talked and wrote about this very loudly, maybe due to its historical revanchisme (as told above) and due to the electoral campaign (as told above). The newspaper Il Manifesto, gave to the declaration and its effects a little attention.

“ *Gli attacchi americani, ha detto Carillo, coincidono in maniera strana e apparentemente illogica con la nuova offensiva di Mosca contro*

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<sup>29</sup> P.Veronese. “ CARTER E IL PCI. Le dichiarazioni Usa al governo alimentano le polemiche tra Marchais e Mitterand”, Il Manifesto, 15 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

<sup>30</sup> P.Veronese “ CARTER E IL PCI. La dichiarazione Usa sui comunisti al governo alimentano le polemiche tra Marchais e Mitterand”, Il Manifesto, 15 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

*l'eurocomunismo, che sta diventando oggi il bersaglio dei tiri concentrati delle due grandi potenze mondiali*"<sup>31</sup>. Santiago Carrillo, secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, had the same reaction of his Italian comrades: he condemned the American interference, but he made another important step than none else made before. Maybe the two superpowers made an attack toward the Eurocommunist parties because they were afraid that they could be separated by their sphere of influence, and in a short time, they could have been creating another political pole different both from the Soviet Communism and from the American capitalism, another way, intermediate between the two superpowers. The world was divided between Atlantic Pact and Warsaw Pact, capitalism and communism. The European communists wanted to create a communist front separated from the Soviet communism. Actually, the three communist parties within the Eurocommunist movement were different from each other; this was the reason why the Eurocommunism failed. The three parties had different ways to create in their own countries a socialist society different from the Soviet model.

Among the European countries, Bonn was the one most worried about the possible entering of the PCI in the government. "*Mentre comincia a delinearsi più chiaramente il ruolo che il governo di Bonn ha avuto nello spingere l'amministrazione Carter a proclamare il suo veto contro l'ingresso dei partiti comunisti occidentali (e in particolar modo il PCI) nell'area di governo dei rispettivi paesi*"<sup>32</sup>. The attitude of the government of the German Federal Republic towards the European communism was due by its commitment to support the network of the Economic Community and the NATO relationship, which have molded the basis of German foreign policy and as consequence provided the economic and security support of Germany postwar prosperity. While both Italian and French communist parties were considered as threats for the survival of these institutions, the Germans saw the prospect of the Historic Compromise government in Italy and the union of the left government in France under very

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<sup>31</sup> " CARTER E IL PCI. Per Santiago Carrillo, un strana coincidenza con gli attacchi di Mosca", Il Manifesto, 15 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

<sup>32</sup> Ieri sulla stampa, " Per i giornali tedeschi quello di Carter è un bel gesto inutile", Il Manifesto, 15 Gennaio 1978, Stampa.

difficult lights. A full communist participation in a government might have threatened Italy's economic stability and this might have required Germany's financial intervention.

During this analysis, I found and contacted the journalists who wrote some of the articles that I quoted. None of them was able to answer to my questions because they did not remember anything about that period and events, and even sending them the copies of the articles written by them, they were not able to make a comment due to the long time past.

## CONCLUSION

This work analyzed the policy conduct of Jimmy Carter toward the Italian Communism seen by Il Manifesto, and by doing so I proceeded in three steps.

First of all, I analyzed, the policy of the Carter Administration and two were the issues that have determined the American foreign policy since Jimmy Carter became president of the United States: détente in general, while human rights in particular. The emphasis on human rights, with the focus on the Soviet Union, contributed to a deterioration of the American-Soviet relations that threatened détente.

In the conduct of policy of the Carter is impossible to have a course of action because the Administration was characterized by a complete disagreement between the National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, sensitive to geopolitical arguments and balance of forces considerations and the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, more inclined to take into account the notions of non-interference and human right in the formulation of foreign policy. A clear example of this problem can be seen in the applied policy toward the Italian communism. During the presidential campaign Carter made some statements in which he seemed more favorable to an American openness toward the communist force in Italy, so that the PCI representatives believed to have the American "support". Some actions launched by the Administration confirmed this hypothesis such as the concession of visas to some PCI exponents and the creation of a network or relations between the US embassy and the PCI in Italy. So the declaration made on 12th January 1978, in which the President put the veto on the PCI entrance in the government was a little bit unexpected. This shift of policy was due to his staff, in particular by Brzezinski.

Even if Carter presented himself as the new political face, in the end he followed the same path of his predecessors about the communist question. In particular he followed the "advices" of his staff, since he had not any experience in the decision of a more political question.

In the second part I analyzed the revolutionary left, in the case of Il Manifesto, and the reasons that pushed it to react against the PCI. The main causes were the reaction that the PCI had towards the Soviet invasion of the Czechoslovakia and the way in which the PCI dealt with the 1968 movements.

Dubcek promised reform, a more democratic life and a new type of socialism. He limited the press censorship, allowed artistic and cultural freedom, limited travel restrictions, promised to guarantee civil rights and liberties and permitted a degree of democratic reform. The fear of the consequences of the Czechoslovakian movement pushed Breznev to the military intervention and he justified it reiterated the right of the Warsaw Pact to intervene if any Soviet satellite compromised the hegemony of the Eastern bloc by looking West. Magri, Natoli, Pintor, Rossanda decided to challenge the leadership of the PCI by not using the traditional method. Natoli, Pintor, Rossanda and Caprara made some statements in which they declared they did not agree with PCI's position on Czechoslovakia ( a merely condemnation of the invasion).

The birth of Il Manifesto represented the history of the left dissent within the PCI. At the beginning of the sixties, the dissent gather around the person of Ingrao. The 1968 was the first mass movement not controlled by the party and that caught everyone unprepared, in particular because the movement did not fight only in the university but it tried to link to the workers in a period in which the PCI was absent from the factories.

Il Manifesto group affirmed that PCI should have gone back to the revolutionary political action and to its traditional role of representing workers and proletarian forces. The disagreement between the group and the policy of PCI was so clear that the split was inevitable, but it occurred because of the secretary of the party found that the existence of an organized dissident group within PCI was incompatible with the principles of the democratic centralism. The divergence with the comrades of Il Manifesto concerned the methods and the themes within the party, the former referred to the democratic centralism and the latter to the student and worker movements, Il Manifesto had the purpose to offer an answer to the class struggles born in the western countries and in the world in the summer

of 1968. Rossanda, Pintor and Natoli failed in their attempt to change the party. Their intention was not to create a faction: they felt that the socialism crisis was real and they believed that the center-left was in an impasse.

The birth of *Il Manifesto* shows that the PCI was not so democratic as it pretended to be.

In the third part, I analyzed the articles of *Il Manifesto* that concerns the declaration of Carter and its consequence. According to *Il Manifesto*, the declaration was not made by the president but by his staff ( probably Brzezinski) and the choice to make it in an official way stated that the decision was taken without any second thoughts. Probably with this choice, the US wanted to keep the status quo, and reiterate its control over the Western Europe, in particular over Italy due to its geopolitical position.

The Italian reaction was totally different from the French one. The former minimized the situation, while the latter had severe reactions due to its political and historical background, furthermore PCF used the declaration to its advantage, in particular because it was in the period of the electoral campaign.

Given that the material available was short I contacted the journalists of the articles in order to have a deep knowledge of the fact and the opinion of the same people who lived that moment, but no one remembered the event, on the contrary they asked me to send to them the articles that they wrote. So I guess that if the event was not remembered by the same persons who wrote about it, maybe in Italy it did not have a lot of importance as it should have.

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## *APPENDIX*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Declassified per NSC 1/11/83  
declassification list 1/19/84

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

February 17, 1978

Presidential Directive/NSC-30

TO: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General  
The Secretary of Commerce  
The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
The United States Representative to the  
United Nations  
The Administrator, Agency for International  
Development  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Human Rights

It shall be a major objective of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world. The policy shall be applied globally, but with due consideration to the cultural, political and historical characteristics of each nation, and to other fundamental U.S. interests with respect to the nation in question.

Specifically:

1. It shall be the objective of the U.S. human rights policy to reduce worldwide governmental violations of the integrity of the person (e.g., torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; lengthy detention without trial, and assassination) and, to enhance civil and political liberties (e.g., freedom of speech, of religion, of assembly, of movement and of the press; and the right to basic judicial protections). It will also be a continuing U.S. objective to promote basic economic and social rights (e.g., adequate food, education, shelter and health).

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

2. In promoting human rights, the United States shall use the full range of its diplomatic tools, including direct diplomatic contacts, public statements, symbolic acts, consultations with allies, cooperation with non-governmental organizations, and work with international organizations.
3. Greater reliance should be placed on positive inducements and incentives acknowledging improvements in human rights whenever appropriate and possible, through preferential treatment in political relations and economic benefits.
4. To this end, countries with a good or substantially improving record of human rights observance will be given special consideration in the allocation of U.S. foreign assistance, just as countries with a poor or deteriorating record will receive less favorable consideration. Programs for each fiscal year shall be reviewed in this light.
5. In the evaluation of the human rights condition of a foreign nation in the course of the implementation of this directive, primary emphasis shall be placed on longer term trends and on the cumulative effect of specific events.
6. The U.S. shall not, other than in exceptional circumstances, take any action which would result in material or financial support to the police, civil law enforcement authorities, or others performing internal security functions of governments engaged in serious violations of human rights.
7. U.S. human rights actions within the International Financial Institutions shall be designed and implemented so as not to undermine the essential U.S. interest of preserving these institutions as effective economic instruments. To this end, future U.S. actions in the International Financial Institutions shall seek to: utilize most effectively both our voice and our vote; understand and attempt to influence the Banks' actions as early as possible in the loan process; and, engage the support of other nations and multilateral organizations.

8. The Interagency Group shall periodically report to the PRC/NSC on the actions taken or recommended pursuant to this Presidential Directive. In particular, the Interagency Group shall, within two months, report on the effectiveness of recent U.S. actions in the International Financial Institutions, with particular attention to: Congressional attitudes and prospective legislation; views of other nations as to the propriety and legality of actions we may take; and, the effect of our actions on the advancement of U.S. human rights objectives.

*Jimmy Carter*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDS

Presidential Directive/NSC-

TO: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General  
The Secretary of Commerce  
The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
The United States Representative to the  
United Nations  
The Administrator, Agency for International  
Development  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Director of U.S. Information Agency

*Need to include other action*  
c) verbal protest (public)  
b) Annual report to Congress (already required)  
c) utilization of OAS, UN, etc  
d) work groups - private  
e) direct diplomatic persuasion (private)  
etc -  
J

SUBJECT: Human Rights

It shall be a major objective of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world. The policy shall be applied globally, but with due consideration to the cultural, political and historical characteristics of each individual nation, and to the significance of U.S. relations with the nation in question.

Specifically:

1. It shall be the objective of the U.S. human rights policy ~~first of all~~ to reduce worldwide governmental violations of the integrity of the person (e.g., torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; lengthy detention without trial and assassination) and ~~secondly~~ to enhance civil and political liberties (freedom of speech, of religion, of assembly, of movement and of the press; and the right to basic judicial protections). It will also be a continuing U.S. objective to promote basic economic and social rights (e.g., adequate food, education, shelter and health).
2. Greater reliance should be placed on positive inducements and incentives, acknowledging improvements in human rights, through whenever appropriate and possible preferential treatment in political relations and economic benefits.

*unhappy have  
the logic*

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Per NSC/HR 2/23/84 re NSC-84-7  
By MIE 3/1/84

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3. To this end, countries with a good or <sup>substantially</sup> improving record of human rights observance ~~as defined above~~, will be given special consideration in the allocation of U.S. foreign assistance. Programs for each fiscal year shall be reviewed in this light.

4. In the evaluation of the human rights condition of a foreign nation <sup>and</sup> in the course of the implementation of this directive, primary emphasis shall be placed on longer term trends, ~~rather than on~~ <sup>and on the</sup> cumulative effect of specific events.

5. The U.S. shall not take any action which would result in material or financial support to the police, civil law enforcement authorities, or internal security forces of governments engaged in serious violations of human rights.

6. U.S. human rights actions within the International Financial Institutions shall be designed and implemented so as not to undermine the primary U.S. interest of preserving these institutions as effective economic instruments. I therefore direct the Interagency Group to prepare a report

- Analyzing the effects of recent U.S. actions in the IFIs, including: <sup>spell out</sup>
- ~~on the IFIs themselves (including an assessment of the legality of our actions);~~ <sup>adequacy of information received from the IFI's, and on</sup> The propriety and legality of action we may take;
  - ~~on~~ Congressional attitudes and prospective legislation; and
  - ~~on~~ the advancement of U.S. human rights objectives.

-- Proposing a strategy for future U.S. actions which will <sup>place</sup> utilize <sup>most effectively both</sup> primary emphasis on the use of our "voice" <sup>and</sup> rather than our vote, <sup>understand</sup> and attempt to influence the Bank's actions as early as possible in the loan process; <sup>and</sup> seek to engage the support of other nations and multilateral organizations.

7. The Interagency Group shall prepare and submit for review by the PRC/NSC, a paper analyzing the appropriateness of using other sanctions or incentives to further the goals defined in this directive.

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DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESIDENT NIACF IMMEDIATE

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR GARDNER

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IT, PINT

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION FOR PUBLIC STATEMENT ON ITALIAN  
POLITICAL SITUATION

1. SUMMARY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR USG TO CONSIDER  
ADDITIONAL COURSES OF ACTION IN EFFORT TO ARREST DRIFT TOWARD  
COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI) PARTICIPATION IN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.  
AS COMPLEMENT TO MY RECENT REPRESENTATIONS IN ROME TO GOVERN-  
MENT AND PARTY LEADERS, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU TAKE ADVANTAGE  
OF YOUR PRESENCE IN BRUSSELS TO MAKE STATEMENT WHICH LEAVES  
NO DOUBT IN MINDS OF ITALIAN POLITICIANS AND PUBLIC THAT THE US  
FIRMLY OPPOSES FURTHER ACCOMMODATION WITH PCI. ADDITIONAL  
DETAILED PROPOSALS WILL BE OFFERED IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES.  
END SUMMARY.

2. THE ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE INITIATED NEGOTIATIONS FOR  
A POSSIBLE REVISION OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT FORMULA IN  
RESPONSE TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S DEMAND (SECONDED BY SOCIALISTS  
AND REPUBLICANS) FOR FULL PARTICIPATION IN A GOVERNMENT OF  
NATIONAL EMERGENCY. AS REPORTED IN OUR YEAR-END ASSESSMENT

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(ROME 20997) THE PRESENT TREND APPEARS LIKELY TO RESULT IN THE  
FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE COMMUNIST  
PARTY (PCI) IN THE PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY (BUT WITHOUT  
MINISTERIAL POSITIONS) AND/OR ACCEPTANCE OF PCI-NOMINATED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT O HOMME  
DATE/CASE ID: 01 SEP 2010 201002655

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For Public Statement on Italian Political Situation è il telegramma

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PROPOSALS FOR ABROGATION OF THE SO-CALLED LEGGE REALE AND THE LAW PROVIDING FOR PUBLIC FINANCING OF POLITICAL PARTIES. HE THOUGHT THAT THE PERCENTAGE OF YES VOTES (PRO-ABROGATION) WOULD BE HIGHER ON THE LATTER PROPOSAL, ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT EITHER ONE WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT VOTES TO PASS. IN REICHLIN'S VIEW, A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF YES VOTES FOR THE TWO PROPOSALS WOULD REPRESENT A PSYCHOLOGICAL SETBACK FOR ALL THE PARTIES OF THE PRESENT PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY AND COULD INTRODUCE A NEW ELEMENT OF FRICTION IN INTER-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS. HOWEVER, REICHLIN DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE REFERENDA RESULTS WOULD HAVE A SERIOUSLY DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION.

6. PCI POLITICAL FORTUNES. COMMENTING ON THE RECENT PCI ELECTORAL SETBACKS, REICHLIN CONCEDED THAT THEY WERE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE SERIOUS THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED. CONCERNING THE REASONS FOR THE LOSSES, HE SAID THAT THESE HAD BEEN AMPLY DISCUSSED BY BERLINGUER IN HIS RECENT CONFERENCE WITH LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS (ROME 9986 NOTAL), ALTHOUGH HE STRESSED THE NEGATIVE EFFECT THAT TERRORISM IN GENERAL AND THE RED BRIGADES IN PARTICULAR HAD HAD ON THE PCI. (REICHLIN REPORTED THAT IN ONE TOWN IN SICILY---GELA---THE LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION HAD BEEN QUERIED BY PARTY MEMBERS AS TO WHY THE PCI HAD ORGANIZED THE KIDNAPPING AND ASSASSINATION OF DC PRESIDENT MORO.) ANALYZING THE SITUATION FURTHER, REICHLIN, POINTING TO EXTREMELY SERIOUS PROBLEMS FACING THE PARTY, OBSERVED THAT THE PCI IS CONFRONTED BY NUMEROUS FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ENEMIES AND THAT THE PARTY HAS DISCOVERED THAT 34 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IS INSUFFICIENT TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY AND TOO LARGE FOR A PARTY TO REMAIN IN THE OPPOSITION. THE PCI OFFICIAL BELIEVES THAT IN THE LONG RUN THE PRESENT STRATEGY OF THE PARTY WILL PRODUCE THE DESIRED RESULTS, SINCE IT IS

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CORRECT, AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE CONTINUED; HOWEVER, HE DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITIES, EVEN IF REMOTE, OF A POLITICAL RETROGRESSION BY THE PCI AND OF A CHANGE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN THE EVENT THAT THE PARTY SHOULD SUFFER A STRING OF POLITICAL LOSSES. FINALLY, REICHLIN PREDICTED THAT THERE WOULD BE A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT POLITICAL

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 4 ROME 4041

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEER, US, IT  
SUBJECT: A DISSENTING VIEW OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ITALY

REF: ROME 3542

THIS TELEGRAM TRANSMITS THE DISSENTING VIEW ON AMERICAN POLICY IN ITALY WHICH WAS REFERRED TO IN SECTION III OF THE REFERENCE MESSAGE.

PART I: THE WEAKNESSES OF EXISTING POLICY

1. "PRESERVATION OF ITALY AS WESTERN-ORIENTED DEMOCRACY AND A FULL PARTICIPANT IN ATLANTIC AND WESTERN EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS" AND "STRENGTHENED DEMOCRATIC FORCES"--THESE LONG-ENSHRINED GOALS OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ITALY WELL SERVE THE PURPOSES OF THE USUAL TYPE OF ANNUAL POLICY REVIEW. SINCE THE GOALS SOUND UNEXCEPTIONABLE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO CHALLENGE THESE FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF OUR POLICY. THE PROBLEM ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THESE OBJECTIVES ARE INVARIABLY USED TO ENTICE THE POLICY REVIEWER TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE UNITED STATES IS CO-RESPONSIBLE FOR ACHIEVING THEM. APPROACHING THE MATTE IN THIS WAY IS A TRICK THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS PLAYED ON ITSELF FOR SO LONG THAT OUR POLICY HAS NOT BEEN SUBJECT TO

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RADICAL QUESTIONING ED REMAINS FIXED IN PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVES THAT ARE INCREASINGLY DIVORCED FROM DEVELOPMENTS IN ITALY AND INCONSISTENT WITH OUR CONTEMPORARY NATIONAL INTEREST.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT O HOMME  
DATE/CASE ID: 25 JAN 2011 201002555

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